Mr. Soule, then the American Minister to Madrid, was the official through whom the negotiations were conducted.  He was a man of somewhat impetuous temperament, and an ardent advocate of Cuba’s annexation.  He quite overstepped both the bounds of propriety and of his authority in his submission, under instructions, of a demand for three hundred thousand dollars indemnity.  This, and Spanish diplomatic methods, led to delay, and the excitement died out.  In the meantime, Spain released the vessel and its cargo, disavowed and disapproved the conduct of the local officials, paid the indemnity claimed by the owners of the vessel, and the ship resumed its regular trips, being treated with every courtesy when visiting Havana.  But the incident gave rise to active discussion, and for a time threatened serious results.  It followed on the heels of another experience, the Lopez expeditions, to which reference is made in another chapter, and came at a time when Cuba and Cuban affairs were topics of a lively public interest.  The subject of acquisition was under general public discussion and occupied a large share of public attention.  Some wanted war with Spain, and others proposed the purchase of the island from Spain.  But the immediate cause of complaint having been removed by the release of the ship, Soule was instructed to take no further steps in the matter, and the excitement gradually passed away.

Immediately following this experience, and growing out of it, came the incident of the “Ostend Manifesto.”  At that time, James Buchanan was Minister to England.  John Y. Mason was Minister to France, and Pierre Soule was Minister to Spain.  Secretary of State Marcy suggested a conference between these three officials.  They met at Ostend, but afterward transferred their deliberations to Aix la Chapelle.  The meeting attracted general attention in Europe.  The result of what they reported as “a full and unreserved interchange of views and sentiments,” was a recommendation that an earnest effort be made immediately to purchase Cuba.  They were of opinion that the sum of one hundred and twenty million dollars be offered.  The report proceeded thus:  “After we shall have offered Spain a price for Cuba far beyond its present value, and this shall have been refused, it will then be time to consider the question, does Cuba in the possession of Spain seriously endanger our internal peace and the existence of our cherished Union?  Should this question be answered in the affirmative, then, by every law, human and divine, we shall be justified in wresting it from Spain if we possess the power; and this upon the very same principle that would justify an individual in tearing down the burning house of his neighbor if there were no other means of preventing the flame from destroying his own home.”  It is evident that Soule dominated the meeting, and only less evident that he, in some way, cajoled his associates into signing the report.  No action was taken on the matter by the Administration, and the incident has passed into history somewhat, perhaps, as one of the curiosities of diplomacy.  At all events, all historians note it, and some give it considerable attention.