“We can scarcely anticipate any future national difference which it would not be more prudent and expedient to submit to arbitration than to the chance of war.  However just may be our cause, however united our people, we cannot foresee the issue of the contest, nor tell what new enemies we may be called to encounter, what sacrifices to bear, what concessions to make.

“We have already partially commenced the experiment of arbitrament, by referring no less than three of our disputes to the determination of as many friendly powers.  A difference as to the meaning of an article, in our last treaty of peace with Great Britain, was referred to the Emperor of Russia, who decided it in our favor.  The question of our northern boundary was referred to the King of the Netherlands; and although the line he assigned was not the one claimed by either party, it was vastly less injurious to each, than would have been one month’s hostility on account of it.  Our disputes with Mexico were verging rapidly to open war, when they were happily submitted to the King of Prussia, and are now in the course of satisfactory adjustment.

“A treaty with France of the character proposed, would greatly increase our importance in the estimation of all Europe—­as it would permanently secure us from her hostility.  It would be seen and felt, that whatever other nation might enter into collision with us, it could not expect the aid of France, but that under all circumstances we should enjoy the friendship and commerce of our ancient ally.  These considerations would not be without their influence on England.  She has colonies near us which we may capture, or essentially injure, and which cannot be defended by her, but at very inconvenient expense.  A war with us must ever be undesired by her, for the obvious reason that in such a contest she has little to gain and much to lose.  Our treaty also with France would deprive England of the aid of the only nation that could afford her effectual assistance in a war against us.  She would therefore, find it her interest to avail herself of a similar treaty, and thus to secure herself from hostilities which on many accounts she must wish to avoid.  Once assured by such treaties of permanent peace with France and England, we should find our alliance courted by the other powers of Europe, who would not readily consent that those two nations should have exclusively the uninterrupted enjoyment of our great and growing commerce.  They would think it a matter of prudence also, to avoid the risk of collision with a powerful republic, that had already secured the permanent friendship of France and England; and they would hasten to contract similar treaties.  Under such circumstances, every consideration of policy would prompt our South American neighbors to desire that their amicable relations with us might remain uninterrupted; and to them we might offer the same stipulations with full confidence of their