private contracts.  Is it to be supposed that the government of a friendly power, in a controversy between us and France, in which it had no interest, and with the observation of the civilized world directed to its decision, would be less likely to pronounce a fair and impartial judgment than either France or ourselves?

“But we can decide our own controversies for ourselves, it is said; that is, we can go to war and take our chance for the result.  Alas, ‘it is an error,’ says Vattel, ’no less absurd than pernicious, to say that war is to decide controversies between those who, as in the case of nations, acknowledge no judge.  It is power or prudence rather than right that victory usually declares for.’—­Book III.  Chap. 3.

“The United States chose to decide for themselves the controversy about impressment, by appealing to the sword.  In this appeal they of course placed no reliance on the propriety and justice of their claims, since such considerations could have no influence on the fate of battle; but they depended solely on their capacity to inflict more injury than they would receive themselves, and this difference in the amount of injury was to turn the scale in our favor.  Our expectations, however, were disappointed.  Our commerce was annihilated, our frontier towns were laid in ashes, our capital taken, our attempts upon Canada were repulsed, with loss and disgrace; our people became burthened with taxes, and we were at last glad to accept a treaty of peace which, instead of containing, as we had fondly hoped, a formal surrender on the part of Great Britain of the right of impressment, made not the slightest allusion to the subject.

“Let us now suppose that a treaty similar to the one we have proposed with France had, in 1812, existed between Great Britain and the United States; the question of impressment would then have been submitted to one or more friendly powers.

“It is scarcely possible that the umpires could have given any decision of this question that would have been as injurious to either party as was the prosecution of the war.  Had the claims of Great Britain been sanctioned, some American seamen would, no doubt, have been occasionally compelled to serve in the British navy; but how very small would have been their number compared with the thousands who perished in the war; and how utterly insignificant would have been their sufferings resulting from serving on board a British instead of an American vessel, when weighed against the burdens, the slaughters, the conflagrations, inflicted on their country in the contest?  If, on the other hand, the decision had been in our favor, Great Britain would have lost a few seamen from her navy, but she would have saved the lives of a far greater number, and she would have been spared an amount of treasure which would have commanded the services of ten times as many sailors as she could ever hope to recover by impressment.

    “It is not, however, probable, that the umpires, anxious to do
    right, and having no motive to do wrong, would have sanctioned,
    without qualification, the claims of either party.