they really are, and not merely as they ought to be, and we should consult expediency as far as we can do so, without compromising principle. * * *

“Of all the nations with whom we have relations, none probably enjoy in an equal degree our good will, as France.  No spirit of rivalry in commerce or manufactures exists between us, no adjacent territory furnishes occasion for border aggressions and mutual criminations, while our past relations afford subjects of pleasing and grateful recollection, and at present we see no prospect of the interruption of that harmony which has so long subsisted between the two nations.

“Let us suppose that under these propitious circumstances, a convention should now be concluded between the two governments, by which it should be agreed, that if unhappily any difference should hereafter arise between us, that could not be adjusted by negociation, neither party should resort to arms, but that they should agree on some friendly power, to whom the matter in difference should be referred, and whose decision should be final; or that if it should so happen that the parties could not concur in selecting an umpire, that then each party should select a friendly power, and that the sovereigns or states thus selected, should, if necessary, call to their aid the assistance of a third.

“To what well founded objections would such a treaty be subject?  It is true that treaties of this kind have been of rare occurrence, but all experience is in their favor.  Vattel remarks (Law of Nations, book II., chap. 18,) ’Arbitration is a method very reasonable, very conformable to the law of nature, in determining differences that do not directly interest the safety of the nation.  Though the strict right may be mistaken by the arbitrator, it is still more to be feared that it will be overwhelmed by the fate of arms.  The Swiss have had the precaution in all their alliances among themselves, and even in those they have contracted with the neighboring powers, to agree beforehand on the manner in which their disputes were to be submitted to arbitrators, in case they could not adjust them in an amicable manner. This wise precaution has not a little contributed to maintain the Helvetic Republic in that flourishing state which secures its liberty, and renders it respectable throughout Europe.’

“But it may be said, a nation ought not to permit others to decide on her rights and claims.  Why not?  Will the decision be less consistent with justice, from being impartial and disinterested?  It is a maxim confirmed by universal experience, that no man should be judge in his own cause; and are nations less under the influence of interest and of passion than individuals?  Are they not, in fact, still less under the control of moral obligation?  Treaties have often been violated by statesmen and senators, who would have shrunk from being equally faithless in their