remarked that “the language of the book is not open to any particular objection”.  I argued that the jury, having exonerated us from any corrupt motive, could not be regarded as having found us guilty on an indictment which charged us with a corrupt motive:  the Lord Chief Justice held that “in the unnecessary and superfluous part of the indictment, there is no judgment against you”, and refused to believe that anyone would be found afterwards so base as to accuse us of evil intent, because of the formal words of the indictment, the jury having acquitted us of any corrupt intention.  The judge unfortunately imputed to others his own uprightness, and we have found many—­among them Sir W.T.  Charley, the present Common Sergeant—­ vile enough to declare what he thought impossible, that we were found guilty of wilfully corrupting the morals of the people.  The judges decided against us on all the points raised, but it is due to them to say that in refusing to quash the indictment, as Mr. Bradlaugh asked, they were misled by the misrepresentation of an American case by Sir Hardinge Giffard, and, to quote the words of the Lord Chief Justice, they sheltered themselves “under the decisions of the American Courts, and left this matter to be carefully gone into by the Court of Error”.

The question of sentence then arose, and two affidavits were put in, one by a reporter of the Morning Advertiser, named Lysaght.  This individual published in the Advertiser a very garbled report of a meeting at the Hall of Science on the previous Sunday, evidently written to anger the Lord Chief Justice, and used by Sir Hardinge Giffard with the same object.  In one thing, however, it was accurate, and that was in stating that we announced our intention to continue the sale of the book.  On this arose an argument with the Lord Chief Justice; he pointed out that we did not deny that the circulation of the book was going on, and we assented that it was so.  It was almost pathetic to see the judge, angry at our resolution, unwilling to sentence us, but determined to vindicate the law he administered.  “The question is,” he urged, “what is to be the future course of your conduct?  The jury have acquitted you of any intention to deliberately violate the law; and that, although you did publish this book, which was a book that ought not to have been published, you were not conscious of the effect it might have, and had no intention to violate the law.  That would induce the Court, if it saw a ready submission on your part, to deal with the case in a very lenient way.  The jury having found that it was a violation of the law, but with a good motive or through ignorance, the Court, in awarding punishment upon such a state of things, would, of course, be disposed to take a most indulgent view of the matter.  But if the law has been openly set at defiance, the matter assumes a very different aspect, and it must be dealt with as a very grave and aggravated case.”  We could not, however, pledge ourselves to do anything more than stop the sale pending the appeal on the writ of error which we had resolved to go for.  “Have you anything to say in mitigation?” was the judge’s last appeal; but Mr. Bradlaugh answered:  “I respectfully submit myself to the sentence of the Court”; and I:  “I have nothing to say in mitigation of punishment”.