[Footnote C:  There is no great battle concerning which so much nonsense has been written and spoken as that of Waterloo, which ought to console us for the hundred-and-one accounts that are current concerning the action of the 21st of July, no two of which are more alike than if the one related to Culloden and the other to Arbela.  The common belief is, that toward the close of the day Napoleon formed two columns of the Old Guard, and sent them against the Allied line; that they advanced, and were simultaneously repulsed by the weight and precision of the English fire in front; and that, on seeing the columns of the Guard fall into disorder, the French all fled, and Wellington immediately ordered his whole line to advance, which prevented the French from rallying, they flying in a disorderly mass, which was incapable of resistance.  So far is this view of the “Crisis of Waterloo” from being correct, that the repulse of the Guard would not have earned with it the loss of the battle, had it not been for a number of circumstances, some of which made as directly in favor of the English as the others worked unfavorably to the French.  When Napoleon found that the operations of Buelow’s Prussians threatened to compromise his right flank and rear, he determined to make a vigorous attempt to drive the Allies from their position in his front, not merely by employing two columns of his Guard, but by making a general attack on Wellington’s line.  For this purpose, he formed one column of four battalions of the Middle Guard, and another of four other battalions of the Middle Guard and two battalions of the Old Guard.  At the same time the corps of D’Erlon and Reille were to advance, and a severe tiraillade was opened by a great number of skirmishers; and the attack was supported by a tremendous fire from artillery.  So animated and effective were the operations of the various bodies of French not belonging to the Guard, that nothing but the arrival of the cavalry brigades of Vandeleur and Vivian, from the extreme left of the Allied line, prevented that line from being pierced in several places.  Those brigades had been relieved by the arrival of the advance of Zieten’s Prussian corps, and were made available for the support of the points threatened by the French.  They were drawn up in rear of bodies of infantry, whom they would not permit to run away, which they sought to do.  The first column of the Guard was repulsed by a fire of cannon and musketry, and when disordered it was charged by Maitland’s brigade of British Guards.  The interval between the advance of that column and that of the second column was from ten to twelve minutes; and the appearance of the second column caused Maitland’s Guards to fall into confusion, and the whole body went to the rear.  This confusion, we are told, was not consequent upon either defeat or panic, but resulted simply from a misunderstanding of the command.  The coming up of the second column