the French succeed in making a large African army available for a European theatre, the estimate of strength of the French army as compared with ours will be quite different.  This possibility must be borne in mind, for, according to the whole previous development of affairs, we may safely assume that France will leave no stone unturned to acquire, if only for a time, a military superiority over Germany.  She knows well that she cannot reach her political goal except by a complete defeat of her eastern neighbour, and that such a result can only be obtained by the exercise of extraordinary efforts.

It is certain that France will not only try to develop her own military power with the utmost energy, but that she will defend herself desperately if attacked by Germany; on the other hand, she will probably not act on the offensive against Germany unless she has increased her own efficiency to the utmost limit, and believes that she has secured the military supremacy by the help of active allies.  The stakes are too high to play under unfavourable conditions.  But if France thinks she has all the trumps in her hands, she will not shrink from an offensive war, and will stake even thing in order to strike us a mortal blow.  We must expect the most bitter hostility from this antagonist.  Should the Triple Alliance break up—­as seems probable now—­this hour will soon have struck.[B] If the war then declared be waged against us in combination with England, it may be assumed that the allied Great Powers would attempt to turn our strategical right flank through Belgium and Holland, and penetrate into the heart of Germany through the great gap in the fortresses between Wesel and Flushing.  This operation would have the considerable advantage of avoiding the strong line of the Rhine and threatening our naval bases from the land side.  From the superiority of the combined Anglo-French fleet, the army of invasion could without difficulty have its base on our coasts.  Such an operation would enormously facilitate the frontal attack on our west frontier, and would enable the French to push a victorious advance onward to the Rhine, after investing Metz and Diedenhofen.

[Footnote B:  Written in October, 1911.]

England, with whose hostility, as well with that of the French, we must reckon, could only undertake a land war against us with the support of an ally who would lead the main attack.  England’s troops would only serve as reinforcements; they are too weak for an independent campaign.  English interests also lie in a quite different field, and are not coincident with those of France.

The main issue for England is to annihilate our navy and oversea commerce, in order to prevent, from reasons already explained, any further expansion of our power.  But it is not her interest to destroy our position as a Continental Power, or to help France to attain the supremacy in Europe.  English interests demand a certain equilibrium between the Continental States.  England only wishes to use France in order, with her help, to attain her own special ends, but she will never impose on herself sacrifices which are not absolutely necessary, for the private advantage of her ally.  These principles will characterize her plan of campaign, if she sees herself compelled by the political position and the interests of her naval supremacy to take part in a war against us.