settlers against the natives.  Since the negroes raised for military service are heathen, it is thought that they will be a counterpoise to the Mohammedan natives.  It has been proved that negro troops stand the climate of North Africa excellently, and form very serviceable troops.  The two black battalions stationed in the Schauja, who took part in the march to Fez, bore the climate well, and thoroughly proved their value.  There can be no doubt that this plan will be vigorously prosecuted, with every prospect of success.  It is so far in an early stage.  Legislative proposals on the use of the military resources offered by the native Algerians and the West African negroes have not yet been laid before Parliament by the Government.  It cannot yet be seen to what extent the native and black troops will be increased.  The former Minister of War, Messimy, had advocated a partial conscription of the native Algerians.  An annual muster is made of the Algerian males of eighteen years of age available for military service.  The Commission appointed for the purpose reported in 1911 that, after the introduction of the limited service in the army and the reserve, there would be in Algeria and Tunisia combined some 100,000 to 120,000 native soldiers available in war-time.  They could also be employed in Europe, and are thus intended to strengthen the Rhine army by three strong army corps of first-class troops, who, in the course of years, may probably be considerably increased by the formation of reserves.

As regards the black troops, the matter is different.  France, in her West African possessions combined, has some 16,000 negro troops available.  As the black population numbers 10,000,000 to 12,000,000, these figures may be considerably raised.

Since May, 1910, there has been an experimental battalion of Senegalese sharp-shooters in Southern Algeria, and in the draft War Budget for 1912 a proposal was made to transfer a second battalion of Senegalese to Algeria.  The conclusion is forced upon us that the plan of sending black troops in larger numbers to Algeria will be vigorously prosecuted.  There is, however, no early probability of masses of black troops being transported to North Africa, since there are not at present a sufficient number of trained men available.  The Senegalese Regiments 1, 2 and 3, stationed in Senegambia, are hardly enough to replace and complete the Senegalese troops quartered in the other African colonies of France.  Although there is no doubt that France is in a position to raise a strong black army, the probability that black divisions will be available for a European war is still remote.  But it cannot be questioned that they will be so some day.

Still less is any immediate employment of native Moroccan troops in Europe contemplated.  Morocco possesses very good native warriors, but the Sultan exerts effective sovereignty only over a part of the territory termed “Morocco.”  There cannot be, therefore, for years to come any question of employing this fighting material on a large scale.  The French and Moroccan Governments are for the moment occupied in organizing a serviceable Sultan’s army of 20,000 men to secure the command of the country and to release the French troops in Morocco.