If we begin by looking at the forces of the individual States and groups of States which may be hostile to us, we have the following results:  According to the recent communications of the French Finance Minister Klotz (in a speech made at the unveiling of a war memorial in Issoudan), the strength of the French army on a peace footing in the year 1910 amounted in round figures to 580,000 men.  This included the “Colonial Corps,” stationed in France itself, which, in case of war, belongs to the field army in the European theatre of war, and the “Service auxiliaire “—­that is, some 30,000 non-efficients, who are drafted in for service without arms.  The entire war establishment, according to the information of the same Minister, including field army and reserves, consists of 2,800,000 men available on mobilization.  A reduction from this number must be made in event of mobilization, which French sources put down at 20 per cent.  The whole strength of the French field army and reserves may therefore be reckoned at some 2,300,000.

To this must be added, as I rather from the same source, 1,700,000 Territorials, with their “reserve,” from which a reduction of 25 per cent., or roughly 450,000 men, must be made.

If it is assumed that, in case of war, the distribution of the arms will correspond to that in peace, the result is, on the basis of the strength of separate arms, which the Budget of 1911 anticipates, that out of the 2,300,000 field and reserve troops there must be assigned—­to the infantry, about 1,530.000; to the cavalry, about 230,000 (since a considerable part of the reservists of these arms are employed in the transport service); to the artillery, about 380,000; to the pioneers, 70,000:  to train and administration services (trains, columns, medical service, etc.), 90,000.

No further increase in these figures is possible, since in France 90 per cent, of all those liable to serve have been called up, and the birth-rate is steadily sinking.  While in 1870 it reached 940,000 yearly, it has sunk in 1908 to 790.000.  Recourse already has been had to the expedient of requiring smaller qualifications than before, and of filling the numerous subsidiary posts (clerks, waiters, etc.) with less efficient men, in order to relieve the troops themselves.

Under these conditions, it was necessary to tap new sources, and the plan has been formed of increasing the troops with native-born Algerians and Tunisians, in order to be able to strengthen the European army with them in event of war.  At the same time negroes, who are excellent and trustworthy material, are to be enrolled in West Africa.  A limited conscription, such as exists in Tunis, is to be introduced into Algeria.  The black army is at first to be completed by volunteers, and conscription will only be enforced at a crisis.  These black troops are in the first place to garrison Algeria and Tunis, to release the troops stationed there for service in Europe, and to protect the white