It is, indeed, impossible so to formulate and fix the political duties of the State that they cannot be looked at from another standpoint.  The social democrat, to whom agitation is an end in itself, will see the duty of the State in a quite different light from the political dilettante, who lives from hand to mouth, without making the bearing of things clear to himself, or from the sober Statesman who looks to the welfare of the community and keeps his eyes fixed on the distant beacons on the horizon of the future.

Certain points of view, however, may be laid down, which, based on the nature of things, check to some degree any arbitrary decision on these momentous questions, and are well adapted to persuade calm and experienced thinkers.

First, it must be observed that military power cannot be improvised in the present political world, even though all the elements for it are present.

Although the German Empire contains 65,000,000 inhabitants, compared to 40,000,000 of French, this excess in population represents merely so much dead capital, unless a corresponding majority of recruits are annually enlisted, and unless in peace-time the necessary machinery is set up for their organization.  The assumption that these masses would be available for the army in the moment of need is a delusion.  It would not mean a strengthening, but a distinct weakening, of the army, not to say a danger, if these untrained masses were at a crisis suddenly sent on active service.  Bourbaki’s campaign shows what is to be expected from such measures.  Owing to the complexity of all modern affairs, the continuous advance in technical skill and in the character of warlike weapons, as also in the increased requirements expected from the individual, long and minute preparations are necessary to procure the highest military values.  Allusion has already been made to this at the beginning of this chapter.  It takes a year to complete a 30-centimetre cannon.  If it is to be ready for use at a given time, it must have been ordered long beforehand.  Years will pass before the full effect of the strengthening of the army, which is now being decided on, appears in the rolls of the Reserve and the Landwehr.  The recruit who begins his service to-day requires a year’s training to become a useful soldier.  With the hasty training of substitute reservists and such expedients, we merely deceive ourselves as to the necessity of serious preparations.  We must not regard the present only, but provide for the future.

The same argument applies to the political conditions.  The man who makes the bulk of the preparations for war dependent on the shifting changes of the politics of the day, who wishes to slacken off in the work of arming because no clouds in the political horizon suggest the necessity of greater efforts, acts contrary to all real statesmanship, and is sinning against his country.

The moment does not decide; the great political aspirations, oppositions, and tensions, which are based on the nature of things—­these turn the scale.