The crushing superiority of civilized States over people with a less developed civilization and military system is due to this altered form of military efficiency.  It was thus that Japan succeeded in raising herself in a brief space to the supremacy in Eastern Asia.  She now reaps in the advancement of her culture what she sowed on the battlefield, and proves once again the immeasurable importance, in its social and educational aspects, of military efficiency.  Our own country, by employing its military powers, has attained a degree of culture which it never could have reached by the methods of peaceful development.

When we regard the change in the nature of military efficiency, we find ourselves on ground where the social duty of maintaining the physical and moral power of the nation to defend itself comes into direct contact with the political duty of preparing for warfare itself.

A great variety of procedure is possible, and actually exists, in regard to the immediate preparations for war.  This is primarily expressed in the choice of the military system, but it is manifested in various other ways.  We see the individual States—­according to their geographical position, their relations to other States and the military strength of their neighbours, according to their historic claims and their greater or less importance in the political system of the world—­making their military preparations with more or less energy, earnestness, and expenditure.  When we consider the complex movements of the life of civilized nations, the variety of its aims and the multiplicity of its emotions, we must agree that the growth or decrease of armaments is everywhere affected by these considerations.  War is only a means of attaining political ends and of supporting moral strength.

Thus, if England attaches most weight to her navy, her insular position and the wide oversea interests which she must protect thoroughly justify her policy.  If, on the other hand, England develops her land forces only with the objects of safeguarding the command of her colonies, repelling a very improbable hostile invasion, and helping an allied Power in a continental war, the general political situation explains the reason.  As a matter of fact, England can never be involved in a great continental European war against her will.

So Switzerland, which has been declared neutral by political treaties, and can therefore only take the field if she is attacked, rightly lays most stress on the social importance of military service, and tries to develop a scheme of defence which consists mainly in increasing the security afforded by her own mountains.  The United States of America, again, are justified in keeping their land forces within very modest limits, while devoting their energies to the increase of their naval power.  No enemy equal to them in strength can ever spring up on the continent of America; they need not fear the invasion of any considerable forces.  On the other hand, they are threatened by oversea conflicts, of epoch-making importance, with the yellow race, which has acquired formidable strength opposite their western coast, and possibly with their great trade rival England, which has, indeed, often made concessions, but may eventually see herself compelled to fight for her position in the world.