After all, the relation of States to each other is that of individuals; and as the individual can decline the interference of others in his affairs, so naturally, the same right belongs to the State.  Above the individual, however, stands the authority of the State, which regulates the relations of the citizens to each other.  But no one stands above the State, which regulates the relations of the citizens to each other.  But no one stands above the State; it is sovereign and must itself decide whether the internal conditions or measures of another state menace its own existence or interests.  In no case, therefore, may a sovereign State renounce the right of interfering in the affairs of other States, should circumstances demand.  Cases may occur at any time, when the party disputes or the preparations of the neighboring country becomes a threat to the existence of a State.  “It can only be asserted that every State acts at its own risk when it interferes in the internal affairs of another State, and that experience shows how very dangerous such an interference may become.”  On the other hand, it must be remembered that the dangers which may arise from non-intervention are occasionally still graver, and that the whole discussion turns, not on an international right, but simply and solely on power and expediency.

I have gone closely into these questions of international policy because, under conditions which are not remote, they may greatly influence the realization of our necessary political aspirations, and may give rise to hostile complications.  Then it becomes essential that we do not allow ourselves to be cramped in our freedom of action by considerations, devoid of any inherent political necessity, which only depend on political expediency, and are not binding on us.  We must remain conscious in all such eventualities that we cannot, under any circumstances, avoid fighting for our position in the world, and that the all-important point is, not to postpone that war as long as possible, but to bring it on under the most favourable conditions possible.  “No man,” so wrote Frederick the Great to Pitt on July 3, 1761, “if he has a grain of sense, will leave his enemies leisure to make all preparations in order to destroy him; he will rather take advantage of his start to put himself in a favourable position.”

If we wish to act in this spirit of prompt and effective policy which guided the great heroes of our past, we must learn to concentrate our forces, and not to dissipate them in centrifugal efforts.

The political and national development of the German people has always, so far back as German history extends, been hampered and hindered by the hereditary defects of its character—­that is, by the particularism of the individual races and States, the theoretic dogmatism of the parties, the incapacity to sacrifice personal interests for great national objects from want of patriotism and of political common sense, often, also, by the pettiness of the prevailing ideas.  Even to-day it is painful to see how the forces of the German nation, which are so restricted and confined in their activities abroad, are wasted in fruitless quarrels among themselves.