Japan has, for the time being, a direct political interest for us only in her influence on the affairs of Russia, America, England, and China.  In the Far East, since Japan has formed an alliance with England, and seems recently to have effected an arrangement with Russia, we have to count more on Japanese hostility than Japanese friendship.  Her attitude to China may prove exceptionally important to our colonial possessions in East Asia.  If the two nations joined hands—­a hardly probable eventuality at present—­it would become difficult for us to maintain an independent position between them.  The political rivalry between the two nations of yellow race must therefore be kept alive.  If they are antagonistic, they will both probably look for help against each other in their relations with Europe, and thus enable the European Powers to retain their possessions in Asia.

While the aspiring Great Powers of the Far East cannot at present directly influence our policy, Turkey—­the predominant Power of the Near East—­is of paramount importance to us.  She is our natural ally; it is emphatically our interest to keep in close touch with her.  The wisest course would have been to have made her earlier a member of the Triple Alliance, and so to have prevented the Turco-Italian War, which threatens to change the whole political situation, to our disadvantage.  Turkey would gain in two ways:  she assures her position both against Russia and against England—­the two States, that is, with whose hostility we have to reckon.  Turkey, also, is the only Power which can threaten England’s position in Egypt, and thus menace the short sea-route and the land communications to India.  We ought to spare no sacrifices to secure this country as an ally for the eventuality of a war with England or Russia.  Turkey’s interests are ours.  It is also to the obvious advantage of Italy that Turkey maintain her commanding position on the Bosphorus and at the Dardanelles, that this important key should not be transferred to the keeping of foreigners, and belong to Russia or England.

If Russia gained the access to the Mediterranean, to which she has so long aspired, she would soon become a prominent Power in its eastern basin, and thus greatly damage the Italian projects in those waters.  Since the English interests, also, would be prejudiced by such a development, the English fleet in the Mediterranean would certainly be strengthened.  Between England, France, and Russia it would be quite impossible for Italy to attain an independent or commanding position, while the opposition of Russia and Turkey leaves the field open to her.  From this view of the question, therefore, it is advisable to end the Turco-Italian conflict, and to try and satisfy the justifiable wishes of Italy at the cost of France, after the next war, it may be.

Spain alone of the remaining European Powers has any independent importance.  She has developed a certain antagonism to France by her Morocco policy, and may, therefore, become eventually a factor in German policy.  The petty States, on the contrary, form no independent centres of gravity, but may, in event of war, prove to possess a by no means negligible importance:  the small Balkan States for Austria and Turkey; Denmark, Holland, Belgium, and Switzerland, and eventually Sweden, for Germany.