It is quite obvious that this policy of marking time, which Russia is adopting for the moment, can only be transitory.  The requirements of the mighty Empire irresistibly compel an expansion towards the sea, whether in the Far East, where it hopes to gain ice-free harbours, or in the direction of the Mediterranean, where the Crescent still glitters on the dome of St. Sophia.  After a successful war, Russia would hardly hesitate to seize the mouth of the Vistula, at the possession of which she has long aimed, and thus to strengthen appreciably her position in the Baltic.

Supremacy in the Balkan Peninsula, free entrance into the Mediterranean, and a strong position on the Baltic, are the goals to which the European policy of Russia has naturally long been directed.  She feels herself, also, the leading power of the Slavonic races, and has for many years been busy in encouraging and extending the spread of this element into Central Europe.

Pan-Slavism is still hard at work.

It is hard to foresee how soon Russia will come out from her retirement and again tread the natural paths of her international policy.  Her present political attitude depends considerably on the person of the present Emperor, who believes in the need of leaning upon a strong monarchical State, such as Germany is, and also on the character of the internal development of the mighty Empire.  The whole body of the nation is so tainted with revolutionary and moral infection, and the peasantry is plunged in such economic disorder, that it is difficult to see from what elements a vivifying force may spring up capable of restoring a healthy condition.  Even the agrarian policy of the present Government has not produced any favourable results, and has so far disappointed expectations.  The possibility thus has always existed that, under the stress of internal affairs, the foreign policy may be reversed and an attempt made to surmount the difficulties at home by successes abroad.  Time and events will decide whether these successes will be sought in the Far East or in the West.  On the one side Japan, and possibly China, must be encountered; on the other, Germany, Austria, and, possibly, Turkey.

Doubtless these conditions must exercise a decisive influence on the Franco-Russian Alliance.  The interests of the two allies are not identical.  While France aims solely at crushing Germany by an aggressive war, Russia from the first has more defensive schemes in view.  She wished to secure herself against any interference by the Powers of Central Europe in the execution of her political plans in the South and East, and at the same time, at the price of an alliance, to raise, on advantageous terms in France, the loans which were so much needed.  Russia at present has no inducement to seek an aggressive war with Germany or to take part in one.  Of course, every further increase of the German power militates against the Russian interests.  We shall therefore always find her on the side of those who try to cross our political paths.