The weakness of this alliance consists in its purely defensive character.  It offers a certain security against hostile aggression, but does not consider the necessary development of events, and does not guarantee to any of its members help in the prosecution of its essential interests.  It is based on a status quo, which was fully justified in its day, but has been left far behind by the march of political events.  Prince Bismarck, in his “Thoughts and Reminiscences,” pointed out that this alliance would not always correspond to the requirements of the future.  Since Italy found the Triple Alliance did not aid her Mediterranean policy, she tried to effect a pacific agreement with England and France, and accordingly retired from the Triple Alliance.  The results of this policy are manifest to-day.  Italy, under an undisguised arrangement with England and France, but in direct opposition to the interests of the Triple Alliance, attacked Turkey, in order to conquer, in Tripoli, the required colonial territory.  This undertaking brought her to the brink of a war with Austria, which, as the supreme Power in the Balkan Peninsula, can never tolerate the encroachment of Italy into those regions.

The Triple Alliance, which in itself represents a natural league, has suffered a rude shock.  The ultimate reason for this result is found in the fact that the parties concerned with a narrow, short-sighted policy look only to their immediate private interests, and pay no regard to the vital needs of the members of the league.  The alliance will not regain its original strength until, under the protection of the allied armies, each of the three States can satisfy its political needs.  We must therefore be solicitous to promote Austria’s position in the Balkans, and Italy’s interests on the Mediterranean.  Only then can we calculate on finding in our allies assistance towards realizing our own political endeavours.  Since, however, it is against all our interests to strengthen Italy at the cost of Turkey, which is, as we shall see, an essential member of the Triple Alliance, we must repair the errors of the past, and in the next great war win back Tunis for Italy.  Only then will Bismarck’s great conception of the Triple Alliance reveal its real meaning.  But the Triple Alliance, so long as it only aims at negative results, and leaves it to the individual allies to pursue their vital interests exclusively by their own resources, will be smitten with sterility.  On the surface, Italy’s Mediterranean interests do not concern us closely.  But their real importance for us is shown by the consideration that the withdrawal of Italy from the Triple Alliance, or, indeed, its secession to an Anglo-Franco-Russian entente, would probably be the signal for a great European war against us and Austria.  Such a development would gravely prejudice the lasting interests of Italy, for she would forfeit her political independence by so doing, and incur the risk of sinking to a sort of vassal state of France.  Such a contingency is not unthinkable, for, in judging the policy of Italy, we must not disregard her relations with England as well as with France.