territories.  There has been no conflict of interests between the two States since the struggle for the supremacy in Germany was decided.  The maritime and commercial interests of the one point to the south and south-east, those of the other to the north.  Any feebleness in the one must react detrimentally on the political relations of the other.  A quarrel between Germany and Austria would leave both States at the mercy of overwhelmingly powerful enemies.  The possibility of each maintaining its political position depends on their standing by each other.  It may be assumed that the relations uniting the two States will be permanent so long as Germans and Magyars are the leading nationalities in the Danubian monarchy.  It was one of the master-strokes of Bismarck’s policy to have recognized the community of Austro-German interests even during the war of 1866, and boldly to have concluded a peace which rendered such an alliance possible.

The weakness of the Austrian Empire lies in the strong admixture of Slavonic elements, which are hostile to the German population, and show many signs of Pan-Slavism.  It is not at present, however, strong enough to influence the political position of the Empire.

Italy, also, is bound to the Triple Alliance by her true interests.  The antagonism to Austria, which has run through Italian history, will diminish when the needs of expansion in other spheres, and of creating a natural channel for the increasing population, are fully recognized by Italy.  Neither condition is impossible.  Irredentism will then lose its political significance, for the position, which belongs to Italy from her geographical situation and her past history, and will promote her true interests if attained, cannot be won in a war with Austria.  It is the position of a leading political and commercial Mediterranean Power.  That is the natural heritage which she can claim.  Neither Germany nor Austria is a rival in this claim, but France, since she has taken up a permanent position on the coast of North Africa, and especially in Tunis, has appropriated a country which would have been the most natural colony for Italy, and has, in point of fact, been largely colonized by Italians.  It would, in my opinion, have been politically right for us, even at the risk of a war with France, to protest against this annexation, and to preserve the territory of Carthage for Italy.  We should have considerably strengthened Italy’s position on the Mediterranean, and created a cause of contention between Italy and France that would have added to the security of the Triple Alliance.