Finally, there is a third point to be considered.  Cases may occur where war must be made simply as a point of honour, although there is no prospect of success.  The responsibility of this has also to be borne.  So at least Frederick the Great thought.  His brother Henry, after the battle of Kolin, had advised him to throw himself at the feet of the Marquise de Pompadour in order to purchase a peace with France.  Again, after the battle of Kunersdorf his position seemed quite hopeless, but the King absolutely refused to abandon the struggle.  He knew better what suited the honour and the moral value of his country, and preferred to die sword in hand than to conclude a degrading peace.  President Roosevelt, in his message to the Congress of the United States of America on December 4, 1906, gave expression to a similar thought.  “It must ever be kept in mind,” so the manly and inspiriting words ran, “that war is not merely justifiable, but imperative, upon honourable men and upon an honourable nation when peace is only to be obtained by the sacrifice of conscientious conviction or of national welfare.  A just war is in the long-run far better for a nation’s soul than the most prosperous peace obtained by an acquiescence in wrong or injustice....  It must be remembered that even to be defeated in war may be better than not to have fought at all.”

To sum up these various views, we may say that expediency in the higher sense must be conclusive in deciding whether to undertake a war in itself morally justifiable.  Such decision is rendered more easy by the consideration that the prospects of success are always the greatest when the moment for declaring war can be settled to suit the political and military situation.

It must further be remembered that every success in foreign policy, especially if obtained by a demonstration of military strength, not only heightens the power of the State in foreign affairs, but adds to the reputation of the Government at home, and thus enables it better to fulfil its moral aims and civilizing duties.

No one will thus dispute the assumption that, under certain circumstances, it is the moral and political duty of the State to employ war as a political means.  So long as all human progress and all natural development are based on the law of conflict, it is necessary to engage in such conflict under the most favourable conditions possible.

When a State is confronted by the material impossibility of supporting any longer the warlike preparations which the power of its enemies has forced upon it, when it is clear that the rival States must gradually acquire from natural reasons a lead that cannot be won back, when there are indications of an offensive alliance of stronger enemies who only await the favourable moment to strike—­the moral duty of the State towards its citizens is to begin the struggle while the prospects of success and the political circumstances are still tolerably favourable.  When, on the other hand, the hostile States are weakened or hampered by affairs at home and abroad, but its own warlike strength shows elements of superiority, it is imperative to use the favourable circumstances to promote its own political aims.  The danger of a war may be faced the more readily if there is good prospect that great results may be obtained with comparatively small sacrifices.