Recognized rights are, of course, often violated by political action.  But these, as we have already shown, are never absolute rights; they are of human origin, and therefore imperfect and variable.  There are conditions under which they do not correspond to the actual truth of things; in this case the summum jus summa injuria holds good, and the infringement of the right appears morally justified.  York’s decision to conclude the convention of Tauroggen was indisputably a violation of right, but it was a moral act, for the Franco-Prussian alliance was made under compulsion, and was antagonistic to all the vital interests of the Prussian State; it was essentially untrue and immoral.  Now it is always justifiable to terminate an immoral situation.

As regards the employment of war as a political means, our argument shows that it becomes the duty of a State to make use of the ultima ratio not only when it is attacked, but when by the policy of other States the power of the particular State is threatened, and peaceful methods are insufficient to secure its integrity.  This power, as we saw, rests on a material basis, but finds expression in ethical values.  War therefore seems imperative when, although the material basis of power is not threatened, the moral influence of the State (and this is the ultimate point at issue) seems to be prejudiced.  Thus apparently trifling causes may under certain circumstances constitute a fully justifiable casus belli if the honour of the State, and consequently its moral prestige, are endangered.  This prestige is an essential part of its power.  An antagonist must never be allowed to believe that there is any lack of determination to assert this prestige, even if the sword must be drawn to do so.

In deciding for war or peace, the next important consideration is whether the question under discussion is sufficiently vital for the power of the State to justify the determination to fight; whether the inevitable dangers and miseries of a war do not threaten to inflict greater injury on the interests of the State than the disadvantages which, according to human calculation, must result if war is not declared.  A further point to be considered is whether the general position of affairs affords some reasonable prospect of military success.  With these considerations of expediency certain other weighty aspects of the question must also be faced.

It must always be kept in mind that a State is not justified in looking only to the present, and merely consulting the immediate advantage of the existing generation.  Such policy would be opposed to all that constitutes the essential nature of the State.  Its conduct must be guided by the moral duties incumbent on it, which, as one step is gained, point to the next higher, and prepare the present for the future.  “The true greatness of the State is that it links the past with the present and the future; consequently the individual has no right to regard the State as a means for attaining his own ambitions in life.” [L]