I have thought it impossible to explain the foundations of political morality better than in the words of our great national historian.  But we can reach the same conclusions by another road.  The individual is responsible only for himself.  If, either from weakness or from moral reasons, he neglects his own advantage, he only injures himself, the consequences of his actions recoil only on him.  The situation is quite different in the case of a State.  It represents the ramifying and often conflicting interests of a community.  Should it from any reason neglect the interests, it not only to some extent prejudices itself as a legal personality, but it injures also the body of private interests which it represents.  This incalculably far-reaching detriment affects not merely one individual responsible merely to himself, but a mass of individuals and the community.  Accordingly it is a moral duty of the State to remain loyal to its own peculiar function as guardian and promoter of all higher interests.  This duty it cannot fulfil unless it possesses the needful power.

The increase of this power is thus from this standpoint also the first and foremost duty of the State.  This aspect of the question supplies a fair standard by which the morality of the actions of the State can be estimated.  The crucial question is, How far has the State performed this duty, and thus served the interests of the community?  And this not merely in the material sense, but in the higher meaning that material interests are justifiable only so far as they promote the power of the State, and thus indirectly its higher aims.

It is obvious, in view of the complexity of social conditions, that numerous private interests must be sacrificed to the interest of the community, and, from the limitations of human discernment, it is only natural that the view taken of interests of the community may be erroneous.  Nevertheless the advancement of the power of the State must be first and foremost the object that guides the statesman’s policy.  “Among all political sins, the sin of feebleness is the most contemptible; it is the political sin against the Holy Ghost.” [J] This argument of political morality is open to the objection that it leads logically to the Jesuitic principle, that the end justifies the means; that, according to it, to increase the power of the State all measures are permissible.

[Footnote J:  Treitschke, “Politik,” i., p 3.]

A most difficult problem is raised by the question how far, for political objects moral in themselves, means may be employed which must be regarded as reprehensible in the life of the individual.  So far as I know, no satisfactory solution has yet been obtained, and I do not feel bound to attempt one at this point.  War, with which I am dealing at present, is no reprehensible means in itself, but it may become so if it pursues unmoral or frivolous aims, which bear no comparison with the seriousness of warlike measures.  I must deviate here a little from my main theme, and discuss shortly some points which touch the question of political morality.