Wherever we open the pages of history we find proofs of the fact that wars, begun at the right moment with manly resolution, have effected the happiest results, both politically and socially.  A feeble policy has always worked harm, since the statesman lacked the requisite firmness to take the risk of a necessary war, since he tried by diplomatic tact to adjust the differences of irreconcilable foes, and deceived himself as to the gravity of the situation and the real importance of the matter.  Our own recent history in its vicissitudes supplies us with the most striking examples of this.

The Great Elector laid the foundations of Prussia’s power by successful and deliberately incurred wars.  Frederick the Great followed in the steps of his glorious ancestor.  “He noticed how his state occupied an untenable middle position between the petty states and the great Powers, and showed his determination to give a definite character (decider cet etre) to this anomalous existence; it had become essential to enlarge the territory of the State and corriger la figure de la Prusse, if Prussia wished to be independent and to bear with honour the great name of ‘Kingdom.’” [D] The King made allowance for this political necessity, and took the bold determination of challenging Austria to fight.  None of the wars which he fought had been forced upon him; none of them did he postpone as long as possible.  He had always determined to be the aggressor, to anticipate his opponents, and to secure for himself favourable prospects of success.  We all know what he achieved.  The whole history of the growth of the European nations and of mankind generally would have been changed had the King lacked that heroic power of decision which he showed.

[Footnote D Treitschke, “Deutsche Geschichte,” i., p. 51.]

We see a quite different development under the reign of Frederick William III., beginning with the year of weakness 1805, of which our nation cannot be too often reminded.

It was manifest that war with Napoleon could not permanently be avoided.  Nevertheless, in spite of the French breach of neutrality, the Prussian Government could not make up its mind to hurry to the help of the allied Russians and Austrians, but tried to maintain peace, though at a great moral cost.  According to all human calculation, the participation of Prussia in the war of 1805 would have given the Allies a decisive superiority.  The adherence to neutrality led to the crash of 1806, and would have meant the final overthrow of Prussia as a State had not the moral qualities still existed there which Frederick the Great had ingrained on her by his wars.  At the darkest moment of defeat they shone most brightly.  In spite of the political downfall, the effects of Frederick’s victories kept that spirit alive with which he had inspired his State and his people.  This is clearly seen in the quite different attitude of the Prussian people and the other Germans under the degrading yoke of the Napoleonic tyranny.  The power which had been acquired by the Prussians through long and glorious wars showed itself more valuable than all the material blessings which peace created; it was not to be broken down by the defeat of 1806, and rendered possible the heroic revival of 1813.