The worst result of our Morocco policy is, however, undoubtedly the deep rift which has been formed in consequence between the Government and the mass of the nationalist party, the loss of confidence among large sections of the nation, extending even to classes of society which, in spite of their regular opposition to the Government, had heartily supported it as the representative of the Empire abroad.  In this weakening of public confidence, which is undisguisedly shown both in the Press and in the Reichstag (although some slight change for the better has followed the latest declarations of the Government), lies the great disadvantage of the Franco-German understanding; for in the critical times which we shall have to face, the Government of the German Empire must be able to rely upon the unanimity of the whole people if it is to ride the storm.  The unveiling of the Anglo-French agreement as to war removes all further doubt on this point.

The existence of such relations between England and France confirms the view of the political situation which I have tried to bring out in the various chapters of this book.  They show that we are confronted by a firm phalanx of foes who, at the very least, are determined to hinder any further expansion of Germany’s power.  With this object, they have done their best, not unsuccessfully, to break up the Triple Alliance, and they will not shrink from a war.  The English Ministers have left no doubt on this point.[A]

[Footnote A:  Cf. speech of Sir E. Grey on November 27, 1911.]

The official statements of the English statesmen have, in spite of all pacific assurances, shown clearly that the paths of English policy lead in the direction which I have indicated.  The warning against aggressive intentions issued to Germany, and the assurance that England would support her allies if necessary with the sword, clearly define the limits that Germany may not transgress if she wishes to avoid war with England.  The meaning of the English Minister’s utterances is not altered by his declaration that England would raise no protest against new acquisitions by Germany in Africa.  England knows too well that every new colonial acquisition means primarily a financial loss to Germany, and that we could not long defend our colonies in case of war.  They form objects which can be taken from us if we are worsted.  Meanwhile a clear commentary on the Minister’s speech may be found in the fact that once more the Budget includes a considerable increase in the naval estimates.

In this position of affairs it would be more than ever foolish to count on any change in English policy.  Even English attempts at a rapprochement must not blind us as to the real situation.  We may at most use them to delay the necessary and inevitable war until we may fairly imagine we have some prospect of success.

If the Imperial Government was of the opinion that it was necessary in the present circumstances to avoid war, still the situation in the world generally shows there can only be a short respite before we once more face the question whether we will draw the sword for our position in the world or renounce such position once and for all.  We must not in any case wait until our opponents have completed their arming and decide that the hour of attack has come.