The German Government, from important reasons which cannot be discussed, have considered it expedient to avoid, under present conditions, a collision with England or France at any cost.  It has accomplished this object by the arrangement with France, and it may be, of course, assumed that no further concessions were attainable, since from the first it was determined not to fight at present.  Only from this aspect can the attitude of the Government towards France and England be considered correct.  It is quite evident from her whole attitude that Great Britain was resolved to take the chance of a war.  Her immediate preparations for war, the movements of her ships, and the attack of English high finance on the foremost German banking establishments, which took place at this crisis, exclude all doubt on the point.  We have probably obtained the concessions made by France only because she thought the favourable moment for the long-planned war had not yet come.  Probably she will wait until, on the one hand, the Triple Alliance is still more loosened and Russia’s efficiency by sea and land is more complete, and until, on the other hand, her own African army has been so far strengthened that it can actively support the Rhine army.

This idea may sufficiently explain the Morocco policy of the Government, but there can be no doubt, if the convention with France be examined, that it does not satisfy fully our justifiable wishes.

It will not be disputed that the commercial and political arrangement as regards Morocco creates favourable conditions of competition for our manufacturers, entrepreneurs and merchants; that the acquisition of territory in the French Congo has a certain and perhaps not inconsiderable value in the future, more especially if we succeed in obtaining the Spanish enclave on the coast, which alone will make the possession really valuable.  On the other hand, what we obtained can never be regarded as a sufficient compensation for what we were compelled to abandon.

I have emphasized in another place the fact that the commercial concessions which France has made are valuable only so long as our armed force guarantees that they are observed; the acquisitions in the Congo region must, as the Imperial Chancellor announced in his speech of November 9, 1911, be regarded, not only from the point of view of their present, but of their future value; but, unfortunately, they seem from this precise point of view very inferior to Morocco, for there can be no doubt that in the future Morocco will be a far more valuable possession for France than the Congo region for Germany, especially if that Spanish enclave cannot be obtained.  The access to the Ubangi and the Congo has at present a more or less theoretical value, and could be barred in case of war with us by a few companies of Senegalese.