If under such uncertain conditions it should be necessary to place the army on a war footing, only one course is left:  we must meet the situation by calling out strategic reserves, which must be all the stronger since the political conditions are so complicated and obscure, and those opponents so strong on whose possible share in the war we must count.  The strategic reserve will be to some extent a political one also.  A series of protective measures, necessary in any case, would have to be at once set on foot, but the mass of the army would not be directed to any definite point until the entire situation was clear and all necessary steps could be considered.  Until that moment the troops of the strategic reserve would be left in their garrisons or collected along the railway lines and at railway centres in such a way that, when occasion arose, they could be despatched in any direction.  On the same principle the rolling-stock on the lines would have to be kept in readiness, the necessary time-tables for the different transport arrangements drawn up, and stores secured in safe depots on as many different lines of march as possible.  Previous arrangements for unloading at the railway stations must be made in accordance with the most various political prospects.  We should in any case be forced to adopt a waiting policy, a strategic defensive, which under present conditions is extremely unfavourable; we should not be able to prevent an invasion by one or other of our enemies.

No proof is necessary to show that a war thus begun cannot hold out good prospects of success.  The very bravest army must succumb if led against a crushingly superior force under most unfavourable conditions.  A military investigation of the situation shows that a plan of campaign, such as would be required here on the inner line, presents, under the modern system of “mass” armies, tremendous difficulties, and has to cope with strategic conditions of the most unfavourable kind.

The disadvantages of such a situation can only be avoided by a policy which makes it feasible to act on the offensive, and, if possible, to overthrow the one antagonist before the other can actively interfere.  On this initiative our safety now depends, just as it did in the days of Frederick the Great.  We must look this truth boldly in the face.  Of course, it can be urged that an attack is just what would produce an unfavourable position for us, since it creates the conditions on which the Franco-Russian alliance would be brought into activity.  If we attacked France or Russia, the ally would be compelled to bring help, and we should be in a far worse position than if we had only one enemy to fight.  Let it then be the task of our diplomacy so to shuffle the cards that we may be attacked by France, for then there would be reasonable prospect that Russia for a time would remain neutral.

This view undoubtedly deserves attention, but we must not hope to bring about this attack by waiting passively.  Neither France nor Russia nor England need to attack in order to further their interests.  So long as we shrink from attack, they can force us to submit to their will by diplomacy, as the upshot of the Morocco negotiations shows.