The second point, clearly brought before us, is that a timid and hesitating policy, which leaves the initiative to the opponent and shrinks from ever carrying out its purpose with warlike methods, always creates an unfavourable military position.  History, as well as theory, tells us by countless instances that a far-seeing, energetic policy, which holds its own in the face of all antagonism, always reacts favourably on the military situation.

In this respect war and policy obey the same laws; great results can only be expected where political and military foresight and resolution join hands.

If we regard from this standpoint the political preparation for the next war which Germany will have to fight, we must come to this conclusion:  the more unfavourable the political conjuncture the greater the necessity for a determined, energetic policy if favourable conditions are to be created for the inevitably threatening war.

So long as we had only to reckon on the possibility of a war on two fronts against France and Russia, and could count on help in this war from all the three parties to the Triple Alliance, the position was comparatively simple.  There were, then, of course, a series of various strategical possibilities; but the problem could be reduced to a small compass:  strategical attack on the one side, strategical defence on the other, or, if the Austrian army was taken into calculation, offensive action on both sides.  To-day the situation is different.

We must consider England, as well as France and Russia.  We must expect not only an attack by sea on our North Sea coasts, but a landing of English forces on the continent of Europe and a violation of Belgo-Dutch neutrality by our enemies.  It is also not inconceivable that England may land troops in Schleswig or Jutland, and try to force Denmark into war with us.  It seems further questionable whether Austria will be in a position to support us with all her forces, whether she will not rather be compelled to safeguard her own particular interests on her south and south-east frontiers.  An attack by France through Switzerland is also increasingly probable, if a complete reorganization of the grouping of the European States is effected.  Finally, we should be seriously menaced in the Baltic if Russia gains time to reconstruct her fleet.

All these unfavourable conditions will certainly not occur simultaneously, but under certain not impossible political combinations they are more or less probable, and must be taken into account from the military aspect.  The military situation thus created is very unfavourable.