In this respect the Russo-Japanese War speaks a clear language.  Japan had made the most judicious preparations possible, political as well as military, for the war, when she concluded the treaty with England and assured herself of the benevolent neutrality of America and China.  Her policy, no less circumspect than bold, did not shrink from beginning at the psychological moment the war which was essential for the attainment of her political ends.  Russia was not prepared in either respect.  She had been forced into a hostile position with Germany from her alliance with France, and therefore dared not denude her west front in order to place sufficient forces in the Far East.  Internal conditions, moreover, compelled her to retain large masses of soldiers in the western part of the Empire.  A large proportion of the troops put into the field against Japan were therefore only inferior reserves.  None of the preparations required by the political position had been made, although the conflict had long been seen to be inevitable.  Thus the war began with disastrous retreats, and was never conducted with any real vigour.  There is no doubt that things would have run a different course had Russia made resolute preparations for the inevitable struggle and had opened the campaign by the offensive.

England, too, was politically surprised by the Boer War, and consequently had not taken any military precautions at all adequate to her aims or suited to give weight to political demands.

Two points stand out clearly from this consideration.

First of all there is a reciprocal relation between the military and political preparations for war.  Proper political preparations for war are only made if the statesman is supported by a military force strong enough to give weight to his demands, and if he ventures on nothing which he cannot carry through by arms.  At the same time the army must be developed on a scale which takes account of the political projects.  The obligation imposed on the General to stand aloof from politics in peace as well as in war only holds good in a limited sense.  The War Minister and the Head of the General Staff must be kept au courant with the all-fluctuating phases of policy; indeed, they must be allowed a certain influence over policy, in order to adapt their measures to its needs, and are entitled to call upon the statesman to act if the military situation is peculiarly favourable.  At the same time the Minister who conducts foreign policy must, on his side, never lose sight of what is in a military sense practicable; he must be constantly kept informed of the precise degree in which army and navy are ready for war, since he must never aim at plans which cannot, if necessary, be carried out by war.  A veiled or open threat of war is the only means the statesman has of carrying out his aims; for in the last resort it is always the realization of the possible consequences of a war which induces the opponent to give in.  Where this means is renounced, a policy of compromise results, which satisfies neither party and seldom produces a permanent settlement; while if a statesman announces the possibility of recourse to the arbitrament of arms, his threat must be no empty one, but must be based on real power and firm determination if it is not to end in political and moral defeat.