It is, however, all the more our duty to spare no sacrifices to carry out both objects—­the enlargement of the fleet, as well as whatever may still be necessary to the perfecting of our coast defences.  Though this latter point calls for the first attention, the great necessity for the navy admits of no doubt.  If we do not to-day stake everything on strengthening our fleet, to insure at least the possibility of a successful war, and if we once more allow our probable opponent to gain a start which it will be scarcely possible to make up in the future, we must renounce for many years to come any place among the World Powers.

Under these circumstances, no one who cherishes German sentiments and German hopes will advocate a policy of renunciation.  On the contrary, we must try not only to prosecute simultaneously the fortification of the coast and the development of the fleet, but we must so accelerate the pace of our ship-building that the requirements of the Naval Act will be met by 1914—­a result quite possible according to expert opinion.

The difficult plight in which we are to-day, as regards our readiness for war, is due to two causes in the past.  It has been produced in the first place because, from love of the pleasures of peace, we have in the long years since the founding of the German Empire neglected to define and strengthen our place among the Powers of Europe, and to win a free hand in world politics, while around us the other Powers were growing more and more threatening.  It was, in my opinion, the most serious mistake in German policy that a final settling of accounts with France was not effected at a time when the state of international affairs was favourable and success might confidently have been expected.  There has, indeed, been no lack of opportunities.  We have only our policy of peace and renunciation to thank for the fact that we are placed in this difficult position, and are confronted by the momentous choice between resigning all claim to world power or disputing this claim against numerically superior enemies.  This policy somewhat resembles the supineness for which England has herself to blame, when she refused her assistance to the Southern States in the American War of Secession, and thus allowed a Power to arise in the form of the United States of North America, which already, although barely fifty years have elapsed, threatens England’s own position as a World Power.  But the consequences of our peace policy hit us harder than England has suffered under her former American policy.  The place of Great Britain as a Great Power is far more secured by her insular position and her command of the seas than ours, which is threatened on all sides by more powerful enemies.  It is true that one cannot anticipate success in any war with certainty, and there was always the possibility during the past forty years that we might not succeed in conquering France as effectually as we would have wished.  This uncertainty is inseparable from every war.  Neither in 1866 nor in 1870 could Bismarck foresee the degree of success which would fall to him, but he dared to fight.  The greatness of the statesman is shown when at the most favourable moment he has the courage to undertake what is the necessary and, according to human calculation, the best course.  Just Fate decides the issue.