These examples, however, show what we may expect from England, and we must be the more prepared to find her using this right to attack without warning, since we also may be under the necessity of using this right.  Our mobilization preparations must therefore be ready for all such eventualities, especially in the period after the dismissal of the reservists.

Public policy forbids any discussion of the steps that must be taken to secure that our fleet is ready for war during this time.  Under all circumstances, however, our coast defences must be continuously ready for fighting, and permanently garrisoned in times of political tension.  The mines must also be prepared for action without delay.  The whole materiel requisite for the purpose must be on the spot ready for instant use.  So, too, all measures for the protection of commerce at the mouths of our rivers and in the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal must be put in force directly the situation becomes strained.  This is a mere simple precept of self-protection.  We must also attach as much importance to the observation and intelligence service on our coasts in peace-time as is done in England.

When we realize in their entirety the mass of preparations which are required for the maintenance of our place among the Great Powers by the navy, we see that extraordinarily exacting demands will be made on the resources of our people.  These weigh the heavier for the moment, since the crisis of the hour forces us to quite exceptional exertions, and the expenditure on the fleet must go hand-in-hand, with very energetic preparations on land.  If we do not possess the strength or the self-devotion to meet this twofold demand, the increase of the fleet must be delayed, and we must restrict ourselves to bringing our coast defences to such a pitch of completeness as will meet all our requirements.  Any acceleration in our ship-building would have to be provisionally dropped.

In opposition to this view, it is urged from one quarter that we should limit our fortification of the coast to what is absolutely necessary, devote all our means to developing the fleet, and lay the greatest stress on the number of the ships and their readiness for war, even in case of the reserve fleet.  This view starts from the presupposition that, in face of so strong and well-equipped a fleet as the Naval Act contemplates for Germany, England would never resolve to declare war on us.  It is also safe to assume that a fleet built expressly on uniform tactical principles represents a more powerful fighting force than we have to-day in an equal number of heterogeneous battleships.

I cannot myself, however, endorse this view.  On the one hand, it is to be feared that the fighting strength of the hostile fleets increases quicker than that of ours; on the other hand, I believe that the general situation makes war with England inevitable, even if our naval force in the shortest time reaches its statutory strength in modern men-of-war.  My view, therefore, is that we must first of all lay the solid foundation without which any successful action against the superior forces of the enemy is unthinkable.  Should the coast fortifications fail to do what is expected from them, success is quite impossible.