and on which the waves of the hostile superiority can break harmlessly, is the recognized and necessary preliminary condition for this class of war.  Without such a trustworthy coast fortress, built with a view to offensive operations, our fleet could be closely blockaded by the enemy, and prevented from any offensive movements.  Mines alone cannot close the navigation so effectively that the enemy cannot break through, nor can they keep it open in such a way that we should be able to adopt the offensive under all circumstances.  For this purpose permanent works are necessary which command the navigation and allow mines to be placed.

I cannot decide the question whether our coast defence, which in the North Sea is concentrated in Heligoland and Borkum, corresponds to these requirements.  If it is not so, then our first most serious duty must be to fill up the existing gaps, in order to create an assured base for our naval operations.  This is a national duty which we dare not evade, although it demands great sacrifices from us.  Even the further development of our fleet, important as that is, would sink into the background as compared with the urgency of this duty, because its only action against the English fleet which holds out any prospect of success presupposes the existence of some such fortress.

But the question must be looked at from another aspect.

The Morocco negotiations in the summer of 1911 displayed the unmistakable hostility of England to us.  They showed that England is determined to hinder by force any real expansion of Germany’s power.  Only the fear of the possible intervention of England deterred us from claiming a sphere of interests of our own in Morocco, and, nevertheless, the attempt to assert our unquestionable rights in North Africa provoked menacing utterances from various English statesmen.

If we consider this behaviour in connection with England’s military preparations, there can be no doubt that England seriously contemplates attacking Germany should the occasion arise.  The concentration of the English naval forces in the North Sea, the feverish haste to increase the English fleet, the construction of new naval stations, undisguisedly intended for action against Germany, of which we have already spoken; the English espionage, lately vigorously practised, on the German coasts, combined with continued attempts to enlist allies against us and to isolate us in Europe—­all this can only be reasonably interpreted as a course of preparation for an aggressive war.  At any rate, it is quite impossible to regard the English preparations as defensive and protective measures only; for the English Government knows perfectly well that Germany cannot think of attacking England:  such an attempt would be objectless from the first.  Since the destruction of the German naval power lies in the distinct interests of England and her schemes for world empire, we must reckon at least with the possibility