It is therefore an erroneous idea that our fleet exists merely for defence, and must be built with that view.  It is intended to meet our political needs, and must therefore be capable of being employed according to the exigencies of the political position; on the offensive, when the political situation demands it, and an attack promises success; on the defensive, when we believe that more advantages can be obtained in this way.  At the present day, indeed, the political grouping of the Great Powers makes a strategical offensive by sea an impossibility.  We must, however, reckon with the future, and then circumstances may arise which would render possible an offensive war on a large scale.

The strength which we wish to give to our fleet must therefore be calculated with regard to its probable duties in war.  It is obvious that we must not merely consider the possible opponents who at the moment are weaker than we are, but rather, and principally, those who are stronger, unless we were in the position to avoid a conflict with them under all circumstances.  Our fleet must in any case be so powerful that our strongest antagonist shrinks from attacking us without convincing reasons.  If he determines to attack us, we must have at least a chance of victoriously repelling this attack—­in other words, of inflicting such heavy loss on the enemy that he will decline in his own interests to carry on the war to the bitter end, and that he will see his own position threatened if he exposes himself to these losses.

This conception of our duty on the sea points directly to the fact that the English fleet must set the standard by which to estimate the necessary size of our naval preparations.  A war with England is probably that which we shall first have to fight out by sea; the possibility of victoriously repelling an English attack must be the guiding principle for our naval preparations; and if the English continuously increase their fleet, we must inevitably follow them on the same road, even beyond the limits of our present Naval Estimates.

We must not, however, forget that it will not be possible for us for many years to attack on the open sea the far superior English fleet.  We may only hope, by the combination of the fleet with the coast fortifications, the airfleet, and the commercial war, to defend ourselves successfully against this our strongest opponent, as was shown in the chapter on the next naval war.  The enemy must be wearied out and exhausted by the enforcement of the blockade, and by fighting against all the expedients which we shall employ for the defence of our coast; our fleet, under the protection of these expedients, will continually inflict partial losses on him, and thus gradually we shall be able to challenge him to a pitched battle on the high seas.  These are the lines that our preparation for war must follow.  A strong coast fortress as a base for our fleet, from which it can easily and at any moment take the offensive,