Under this head, attention must be called to the independent manoeuvres of artillery regiments and brigades in the country, which entail large expenditure, and, in fact, do more harm than good.  They must, in my opinion, be abandoned or at least considerably modified, since their possible use is not in proportion to their cost and their drawbacks.  They lead to pronounced tactics of position (Stellungstaktik) which are impracticable in war; and the most important lesson in actual war—­the timely employment of artillery within a defined space and for a definite object without any previous reconnoitring of the country in search of suitable positions for the batteries—­can never be learnt on these manoeuvres.  They could be made more instructive if the tactical limits were marked by troops; but the chief defect in these manoeuvres—­viz., that the artillery is regarded as the decisive arm—­cannot be thus remedied.  The usual result is that favourable artillery positions are searched for, and that they are then adhered to under some tactical pretence.

After all, only a slight shifting of the existing centre of gravity may be necessary, so far as the development of the fighting tactics of the various branches of the service is concerned, in order to bring them into line with modern conditions.  If, however, the troops are to be educated to a higher efficiency in operations, completely new ground must be broken, on which, I am convinced, great results and an undoubted superiority over our opponents can be attained.  Considerable difficulties will have to be surmounted, for the crucial point is to amass immense armies on a genuine war footing; but these difficulties are not, in my opinion, insurmountable.

There are two chief points:  first, the practice of marching and operations in formations at war strength, fully equipped with well-stocked magazines as on active service; and, secondly, a reorganization of the manoeuvres, which must be combined with a more thorough education of the chief commanders.

As regards the first point, practice on this scale, so far as I know, has never yet been attempted.  But if we consider, firstly, how valuable more rapid and accurate movements of great masses will be for the war of the future, and, secondly, what serious difficulties they involve, we shall be rewarded for the attempt to prepare the army systematically for the discharge of such duties, and thus to win an unquestioned advantage over our supposed antagonist.

The preparation for the larger manoeuvres of this sort can naturally also be carried out in smaller formation.  It is, moreover, very important to train large masses of troops—­brigades and divisions—­in long marches across country by night and day with pioneer sections in the vanguard, in order to gain experience for the technique of such movements, and to acquire by practice a certain security in them.