These conditions, then, are a great check on the freedom of operations, but, quite apart from the commissariat question, the movements of an army present considerable difficulties in themselves, which it is obviously very hard for the inexperienced to surmount.  When, in 1870, some rather complicated army movements were contemplated, as on the advance to Sedan, it was at once seen that the chief commanders were not masters of the situation, that only the fertility of the theatre of war and the deficient attacking powers of the French allowed the operations to succeed, although a man like Moltke was at the head of the army.  All these matters have since been thoroughly worked out by our General Staff, but the theoretical labours of the General Staff are by no means the common property of the army.

On all these grounds I believe that first and foremost our manoeuvres must be placed on a new footing corresponding to the completely altered conditions, and that we must leave the beaten paths of tradition.  The troops must be trained—­as formerly—­to the highest tactical efficiency, and the army must be developed into the most effective machine for carrying out operations; success in modern war turns on these two pivots.  But the leaders must be definitely educated for that war on the great scale which some day will have to be fought to a finish.  The paths we have hitherto followed do not lead to this goal.

All methods of training and education must be in accordance with these views.

I do not propose to go further into the battle training of infantry and cavalry in this place, since I have already discussed the question at length in special treatises.[A] In the case of the artillery alone, some remarks on the principles guiding the technical training of this arm seem necessary.

[Footnote A:  v.  Bernhardi:  “Taktik und Ausbildung der Infanterie,” 1910 “Unsere Kavallerie im naechsten Krieg,” 1899; “Reiterdienst,” 1910.]

The demands on the fighting-efficiency of this arm—­as is partly expressed in the regulations—­may be summed up as follows:  all preconceived ideas and theories as to its employment must be put on one side, and its one guiding principle must be to support the cavalry or infantry at the decisive point.  This principle is universally acknowledged in theory, but it ought to be more enforced in practice.  The artillery, therefore, must try more than ever to bring their tactical duties into the foreground and to make their special technical requirements subservient to this idea.  The ever-recurring tendency to fight chiefly the enemy’s artillery must be emphatically checked.  On the defensive it will, of course, often be necessary to engage the attacking artillery, if there is any prospect of success, since this is the most dreaded enemy of the infantry on the defensive; but, on the attack, its chief duty always is to fire upon the enemy’s infantry, where possible, from masked positions.  The principle of keeping the