Another way to adapt the organization better to the efficiency of the arm than at present would be that the four cavalry regiments belonging to each army corps should be combined into a brigade and placed under the commanding General.  In event of mobilization, one regiment would be withdrawn for the two divisions, while the brigade, now three regiments strong, would pass over to the “army” cavalry.  The regiment intended for divisional cavalry would, on mobilization, form itself into six squadrons and place three of them at the service of each division.  If the army corps was formed into three divisions, each division would only be able to receive two squadrons.

In this way, of course, a very weak and inferior divisional cavalry would be formed; the service in the field would suffer heavily under it; but since it is still more important to have at hand a sufficient army cavalry than a divisional cavalry, quite competent for their difficult task, there is, for the time being, no course left than to raise the one to its indispensable strength at the cost of the other.  The blame for such a makeshift, which seriously injures the army, falls upon those who did not advocate an increase of the cavalry at the proper moment.  The whole discussion shows how absolutely necessary such an increase is.  If it were effected, it would naturally react upon the organization of the arm.  This would have to be adapted to the new conditions.  There are various ways in which a sound and suitable development of the cavalry can be guaranteed.

The absolutely necessary cyclist sections must in any case be attached to the cavalry in peace, in order that the two arms may be drilled in co-operation, and that the cavalry commander may learn to make appropriate use of this important arm.  Since the cyclists are restricted to fairly good roads, the co-operation presents difficulties which require to be surmounted.

The views which I have here tried to sketch as aspects of the organization of the army can be combated from several standpoints.  In military questions, particularly, different estimates of the individual factors lead to very different results.  I believe, however, that my opinions result with a certain logical necessity from the whole aspect of affairs.  It is most essential, in preparing for war, to keep the main leading idea fixed and firm, and not to allow it to be shaken by question of detail.  Each special requirement must be regarded as part of that general combination of things which only really comes into view in actual warfare.  The special standpoint of a particular arm must be rejected as unjustified, and the departmental spirit must be silenced.  Care must be taken not to overestimate the technical and material means of power in spite of their undoubted importance, and to take sufficient account of the spiritual and moral factors.  Our age, which has made such progress in the conquest of nature, is inclined to attach too much importance to this dominion over natural forces; but in the last resort, the forces that give victory are in the men and not in the means which they employ.