The cavalry must be increased, strengthened by cyclist sections, and so organized as to insure their efficiency in war.

The formation of reinforcements, especially for supplies, must be so elaborated that, on a rapid advance, an efficient system of feeding the troops entirely from magazine depots can be maintained.

The air-fleet must be energetically developed with the object of making it a better fighting machine than that of the enemy.

Finally, and this is the most important thing, we must strain every nerve to render our infantry tactically the best in the world, and to take care that none but thoroughly efficient formations are employed in the decisive field war.

The fulfilment of all these requirements on the basis of our present organization offers naturally great difficulties and can hardly be carried out.  It is impossible to imagine a German Reichstag which, without the most extreme pressure of circumstances, could resolve to make for the army the sacrifices called for by our political condition.  The temptation to shut the eyes to existing dangers and to limit political aims in order to repudiate the need of great sacrifices is so strong that men are sure to succumb to it, especially at a period when all political wisdom seems summed up in the maintenance of peace.  They comfort themselves with the hope that the worst will not happen, although history shows that the misery produced by weakness has often surpassed all expectations.

But even if the nation can hardly be expected to understand what is necessary, yet the War Department must be asked to do their utmost to achieve what is possible, and not to stop short out of deference to public opinion.  When the future of a great and noble nation is at stake there is no room for cowardice or inaction.  Nothing must be done, as unhappily has too often been the case, which runs counter to the principles of a sound military organization.

The threefold division of the larger formations could be effected in various ways.  Very divergent ideas may be entertained on this subject, and the difficulties of carrying out the scheme need extensive consideration.  I will make a few proposals just by way of illustration.

One way would be to split up the army corps into three divisions of three infantry regiments each, and to abolish the superfluous intermediate system of brigades.  Another proposal would be to form in every corps one of the present divisions of three brigades, so that the extra brigade combined with the light field howitzers and the Jaeger battalion would constitute in event of war a separate detachment in the hands of the commanding General.  This last arrangement could be carried out comparatively easily under our present system, but entails the drawback that the system of twofold division is still in force within the brigades and divisions.  The most sweeping reform, that of dividing the corps into three divisions, would have the advantage of being thorough and would allow the separate groups to be employed in many more ways.