from the tactical point of view, and because they cost a great deal.  There is a general tendency to judge cavalry by the standard of 1866 and 1870-71.  It cannot be emphasized too strongly that this standard is misleading.  On the one hand, the equipment was then so defective that it crippled the powers of the mounted man in the most important points; on the other hand, the employment of the cavalry was conducted on a wholly antiquated system.  It was, consequently, not armed for independent movements.  What they then did must not be compared with what will be required from them in the future.  In wars in which mounted forces were really effective, and not hampered in their movements by preconceived notions (as in the American War of Secession and the Boer War), their employment has been continuously extended, since the great value of their operative mobility was convincingly shown, especially in Africa, notwithstanding all modern weapons.  These are the wars which must be studied in order to form a fair opinion.  They will convince us that an increase of our cavalry is absolutely imperative.  It will, of course, only be valuable when the divisions of the army cavalry are equipped with columns and trains in such a way that they can operate independently.  The effectiveness of the cavalry depends entirely on the fulfilment of this condition.  It is also imperatively necessary, when the measures of our opponents are considered, to strengthen the fighting force of the cavalry by an adequate addition of cyclist sections.  This is the more requisite, as, on the one hand, the attack on the enemy’s communications must expect vigorous opposition, and, on the other hand, the screening duties, which are even more important for the offensive than the reconnaissances, are likely to be specially successful if cavalry and cyclists combine.  Again, an increased strength of cavalry is undeniably required to meet the reconnoitring and screening troops of the enemy.

Besides the strengthening of this arm and the addition of cyclists, another organization is required if the cavalry are to do useful service.  Brigades of two regiments and divisions of six regiments are in war-time, where all depends on decisive action, far too small, as I have repeatedly demonstrated without being refuted.

The brigades must in war be three regiments strong.  The strength of the divisions and corps may vary according to the requirements of the time being.  Just because our cavalry is so weak, the organization must be in a high degree elastic.  There can, besides, be no doubt on the point that the side which commands the services of the stronger cavalry, led on modern lines, will have at the outset quite inestimable advantage over the enemy, which must make itself felt in the ultimate issue.