Until recently we had only one united corps of pioneers, which was organized alike for operations in the field and for siege operations, but these latter have recently been so much developed that that system can no longer supply an adequate technical training for them.

The demands made by this department of warfare, on the one hand, and by the duties of pioneering in the field on the other, are so extensive and so essentially different that it seems quite impracticable to train adequately one and the same corps in both branches during two years’ service.  The chief functions of the field pioneer are bridge-building, fortifying positions, and supporting the infantry in the attack on fortified places.  The most important part of the fortress pioneer’s duties consists in sapping, and, above all, in mining, in preparing for the storming of permanent works, and in supporting the infantry in the actual storm.  The army cannot be satisfied with a superficial training for such service; it demands a most thorough going previous preparation.

Starting from this point of view, General v.  Beseler, the late Inspector-General of Fortresses and Pioneers, who has done inestimable service to his country, laid the foundations of a new organization.  This follows the idea of the field pioneers and the fortress pioneers—­a rudimentary training in common, followed by separate special training for their special duties.  We must continue on these lines, and develop more particularly the fortress pioneer branch of the service in better proportion to its value.

In connection with the requirements already discussed, which are directly concerned with securing and maintaining an increase of tactical efficiency, we must finally mention two organizations which indirectly serve the same purpose.  These diminish the tactical efficiency of the enemy, and so increase our own; while, by reconnoitring and by screening movements, they help the attack and make it possible to take the enemy unawares—­an important condition of successful offensive warfare.  I refer to the cavalry and the air-fleet.

The cavalry’s duties are twofold.  On the one hand, they must carry out reconnaissances and screening movements, on the other hand they must operate against the enemy’s communications, continually interrupt the regular renewal of his supplies, and thus cripple his mobility.

Every military expert will admit that our cavalry, in proportion to the war-footing of the army, and in view of the responsible duties assigned them in war, is lamentably weak.  This disproportion is clearly seen if we look at the probable wastage on the march and in action, and realize that it is virtually impossible to replace these losses adequately, and that formations of cavalry reserves can only possess a very limited efficiency.  Popular opinion considers cavalry more or less superfluous, because in our last wars they certainly achieved comparatively little