line in its whole extension, they required on their side equally heavy guns.  It should be noticed that they did not distribute their very effective 12-centimetre field howitzers along the whole front, but, so far as I can gather, assigned them all to the army of General Nogi, whose duty was to carry out the decisive enveloping movement at Mukden.  The Japanese thus felt the need of concentrating the effect of their howitzers, and as we hope we shall not imitate their frontal attack, but break through the enemy’s front, though in a different way from theirs, the question of concentration seems to me very important for us.

Under these circumstances it will be most advantageous to unite the heavy batteries in the hand of the Commander-in-Chief.  They thus best serve his scheme of offence.  He can mass them at the place which he wishes to make the decisive point in the battle, and will thus attain that end most completely, whereas the distribution of them among the army corps only dissipates their effectiveness.  His heavy batteries will be for him what the artillery reserves are for the divisional General.  There, where their mighty voice roars over the battlefield, will be the deciding struggle of the day.  Every man, down to the last private, knows that.

I will only mention incidentally that the present organization of the heavy artillery on a peace footing is unsatisfactory.  The batteries which in war are assigned to the field army must in peace also be placed under the orders of the corps commanders (Truppenfuehrer) if they are to become an organic part of the whole.  At present the heavy artillery of the field army is placed under the general-inspection of the foot artillery, and attached to the troops only for purposes of manoeuvres.  It thus remains an isolated organism so far as the army goes, and does not feel itself an integral part of the whole.  A clear distinction between field artillery and fortress artillery would be more practical.

This view seems at first sight to contradict the requirement that the heavy batteries should form a reserve in the hands of the Commander-in-Chief.  As the armies do not exist in peace-time, and manoeuvres are seldom carried out in army formation, the result of the present organization is that the tactical relations of the heavy artillery and the other troops are not sufficiently understood.  This disadvantage would be removed if heavy artillery were assigned permanently to each army corps.  This would not prevent it being united in war-time in the hands of the army leaders.  On the contrary, they would be used in manoeuvres in relation to the army corps in precisely the same sense as they would be in war-time in relation to the armies.

The operations of the army in the enemy’s countries will be far more effective if it has control of the railways and roads.  That implies not merely the restoration of railroads that may have been destroyed, but the rapid capture of the barrier forts and fortresses which impede the advance of the army by cutting off the railway communications.  We were taught the lesson in 1870-71 in France how far defective railway communications hindered all operations.  It is, therefore, of vital importance that a corps should be available, whose main duty is the discharge of these necessary functions.