of enforcing his tactical aims.  He is now forced to form a reserve for himself out of the artillery of the division, and thus to deprive one division at least of half its artillery.  If he has the natural desire to withdraw for himself the howitzer section, which is found in one division only, the same division must always be subjected to this reduction of its strength, and it is more than problematical whether this result always fits in with the tactical position.  It seems at least worth while considering whether, under these circumstances, it would not be a more appropriate arrangement to attach a howitzer section to each division.

The distribution of the heavy field howitzers is another momentous question.  It would be in accordance with the principles that guide the whole army to divide them equally among the army corps.  This arrangement would have much in its favour, for every corps may find itself in a position where heavy howitzer batteries can be profitably employed.  They can also, however, be combined under the command of the General-in-Chief, and attached to the second line of the army.  The first arrangement offers, as has been said, many advantages, but entails the great disadvantage that the line of march of the army corps is dangerously lengthened by several kilometres, so that no course is left but either to weaken the other troops of the corps or to sacrifice the indispensable property of tactical efficiency.  Both alternatives are inadmissible.  On the other hand, since the employment of heavy howitzers is by no means necessary in every engagement, but only when an attack is planned against a strongly-posted enemy, it may be safely assumed that the heavy howitzers could be brought up in time out of the second line by a night march.  Besides, their mobility renders it possible to detach single batteries or sections, and on emergency to attach them to an army corps temporarily.

There is a prevalent notion that the heavy howitzers are principally used to fight the enemy’s field artillery, and therefore must be on the spot in every engagement.  They have even been known to stray into the advance guard.  I do not approve of this idea.  The enemy’s field artillery will fire indirectly from previously masked positions, and in such case they cannot be very successfully attacked by heavy howitzers.  It seems to me quite unjustifiable, with the view of attaining this problematic object, to burden the marching columns permanently with long unwieldy trains of artillery and ammunition, and thus to render their effectiveness doubtful.

No doubt the Japanese, who throughout the war continually increased their heavy field howitzers, ultimately attached artillery of that sort to every division.  The experiences of that war must not, however, be overestimated or generalized.  The conditions were quite sui generis.  The Japanese fought on their whole front against fortified positions strengthened by heavy artillery, and as they attacked the enemy’s