This essential contradiction between what is necessary and what is attained appears in the enforcement of the law of universal military service.  Opinion oscillates between the wish to enforce it more or less, and the disinclination to make the required outlay, and recourse is had to all sorts of subterfuges which may save appearances without giving a good trial to the system.  One of these methods is the Ersatzreserve, which is once more being frequently proposed.  But the situation is by no means helped by the very brief training which these units at best receive.  This system only creates a military mob, which has no capacity for serious military operations.  Such an institution would be a heavy strain on the existing teaching personnel in the army, and would be indirectly detrimental to it as well.  Nor would any strengthening of the field army be possible under this scheme, since the cadres to contain the mass of these special reservists are not ready to hand.  This mass would therefore only fill up the recruiting depots, and facilitate to some degree the task of making good the losses.

A similar contradiction is often shown in the employment of the troops.  Every army at the present time is divided into regular troops, who are already organized in time of peace and are merely brought to full strength in war-time, and new formations, which are only organized on mobilization.  The tactical value of these latter varies much according to their composition and the age of the units, but is always much inferior to that of the regular troops.  The Landwehr formations, which were employed in the field in 1870-71, were an example of this, notwithstanding the excellent services which they rendered, and the new French formations in that campaign were totally ineffective.  The sphere of activity of such troops is the second line.  In an offensive war their duty is to secure the railroads and bases, to garrison the conquered territory, and partly also to besiege the enemies’ fortresses.  In fact, they must discharge all the duties which would otherwise weaken the field army.  In a defensive war they will have to undertake the local and mainly passive defence, and the support of the national war.  By acting at first in this limited sphere, such new formations will gradually become fitted for the duties of the war, and will acquire a degree of offensive strength which certainly cannot be reckoned upon at the outset of the war; and the less adequately such bodies of troops are supplied with columns, trains, and cavalry, the less their value will be.

Nevertheless, it appears to be assumed by us that, in event of war, such troops will be partly available in the first line, and that decisive operations may be entrusted to them.  Reserves and regulars are treated as equivalent pieces on the board, and no one seems to suppose that some are less effective than others.  A great danger lies in this mechanical conception.