France has at the present day a population of some 40,000,000; Russia in Europe, with Poland and the Caucasus, has a population of 140,000,000.  Contrasted with this, Germany has only 65,000,000 inhabitants.  But since the Russian military forces are, to a great extent, hampered by very various causes and cannot be employed at any one time or place, and are also deficient in military value, a German army which corresponded to the population would be certainly in a position to defend itself successfully against its two enemies, if it operated resolutely on the inner line, even though England took part in the war.

Disastrously for ourselves, we have become disloyal to the idea of universal military service, and have apparently definitely discontinued to carry it out effectively.  The country where universal service exists is now France.  With us, indeed, it is still talked about, but it is only kept up in pretence, for in reality 50 per cent., perhaps, of the able-bodied are called up for training.  In particular, very little use has been made of the larger towns as recruiting-grounds for the army.

In this direction some reorganization is required which will energetically combine the forces of the nation and create a real army, such as we have not at the present time.  Unless we satisfy this demand, we shall not long be able to hold our own against the hostile Powers.

Although we recognize this necessity as a national duty, we must not shut our eyes to the fact that it is impossible in a short time to make up our deficiencies.  Our peace army cannot be suddenly increased by 150,000 men.  The necessary training staff and equipment would not be forthcoming, and on the financial side the required expenditure could not all at once be incurred.  The full effectiveness of an increased army only begins to be gradually felt when the number of reservists and Landwehr is correspondingly raised.  We can therefore only slowly recur to the reinforcement of universal service.  The note struck by the new Five Years Act cannot be justified on any grounds.  But although we wish to increase our army on a more extensive scale, we must admit that, even if we strain our resources, the process can only work slowly, and that we cannot hope for a long time to equalize even approximately the superior forces of our opponents.

We must not, therefore, be content merely to strengthen our army; we must devise other means of gaining the upper hand of our enemies.  These means can only be found in the spiritual domain.

History teaches us by countless examples that numbers in themselves have only been the decisive factor in war when the opponents have been equally matched otherwise, or when the superiority of the one party exceeds the proportion required by the numerical law.[A] In most cases it was a special advantage possessed by the one party—­better equipment, greater efficiency of troops, brilliant leadership, or more able strategy—­which