superiority, to inflict any serious damage on the blockading fleet on this line, and the only course left is to advance from the Baltic against the north-eastern part of the blockading line.  Here we should have a tolerably secure retreat.  This accentuates once more the supreme importance to us of keeping open, at all costs, the passage through the Sound and the Great Belt.  The command of these straits will not only secure the Baltic basin for us, but also keep open the sally-ports for our offensive operations against the English blockading fleet.

In spite of all the advantages which the extended system of blockade offers to the English, there are two objections against it which are well worth considering from the English point of view.  Firstly, it prejudices the interests of a number of nations whose coasts are washed by the North Sea and the Baltic, since they are included in the blockade; secondly, it compels England to break up her fleet into two or three divisions.

As to the first objection, we have hinted that England will scarcely let herself be hindered in the pursuit of her own advantage by the interests of weaker third parties.  It is also conceivable that some satisfactory arrangement as to the blockade can be made with the States affected.  As regards the splitting up of the fleet, no especially disadvantageous conditions are thereby produced.  It is easy to reunite the temporarily divided parts, and the strength of the combined fleet guarantees the superiority of the separate divisions over the German forces at sea.  Nevertheless, this division of the attacking fleet gives the defending party the chance of attacking some detached portions before junction with the main body, and of inflicting loss on them, if the enemy can be deceived and surprised by prompt action.  The demonstrations which are the ordinary tactics in war on land under such conditions cannot be employed, owing to the facility with which the sea can be patrolled.

This blockade would ultimately weaken and weary the attacking party.  But it must be recognized that it is a far easier plan to carry out than the close blockade, and that it would tax the offensive powers of our fleet more severely.  We should not only have to venture on attacks in far-distant waters, but must be strong enough to protect efficiently the threatened flank of our attacking fleet.

After all, it is improbable that the English would have recourse to a mere blockade.  The reasons which would prompt them to a rapid decision of the war have been already explained.  It was shown that, in the event of their fighting in alliance with France, they would probably attempt to land troops in order to support their fleet from the land side.  They could not obtain a decisive result unless they attempted to capture our naval bases—­Wilhelmshaven, Heligoland, the mouth of the Elbe, and Kiel—­and to annihilate our fleet in its attempt to protect these places, and thus render it impossible for us to continue the war by sea.