It is, however, very unlikely that England would tolerate such communications through neutral territory, since in that way the effect of her war on our trade would be much reduced.  The attempt to block these trade routes would approximate to a breach of neutrality, and the States in question would have to face the momentous question, whether they would conform to England’s will, and thus incur Germany’s enmity, or would prefer that adhesion to the German Empire which geography dictates.  They would have the choice between a naval war with England and a Continental war with their German neighbours—­two possibilities, each of which contains great dangers.  That England would pay much attention to the neutrality of weaker neighbours when such a stake was at issue is hardly credible.

The ultimate decision of the individual neutral States cannot be foreseen.  It would probably depend on the general political position and the attitude of the other World Powers to the Anglo-German contest.  The policy adopted by France and Russia would be an important factor.  One can easily understand under these circumstances that the Dutch are seriously proposing to fortify strongly the most important points on their coast, in order to be able to maintain their neutrality on the sea side.  They are also anxious about their eastern frontier, which obviously would be threatened by a German attack so soon as they sided with our enemies.

I shall not enter further into the political and military possibilities which might arise if Holland, Belgium, and Denmark were driven to a sympathetic understanding by the war.  I will only point out how widespread an effect the naval war can, or rather must, exercise on the Continental war and on the political relations generally.  The attitude of Denmark would be very important, since the passage to and from the Baltic must mainly depend on her.  It is vital to us that these communications be kept open, and measures must be taken to insure this.  The open door through the Belt and the Sound can become highly important for the conduct of the war.  Free commerce with Sweden is essential for us, since our industries will depend more and more on the Swedish iron-ore as imports from other countries become interrupted.

It will rest with the general state of affairs and the policy of the interested nations whether this sea route can be safeguarded by diplomatic negotiations, or must be kept open by military action.  We cannot allow a hostile power to occupy the Danish islands.

Complicated and grave questions, military as well as political, are thus raised by an Anglo-German war.  Our trade would in any case suffer greatly, for sea communications could be cut off on every side.  Let us assume that France and Russia seal our land frontiers, then the only trade route left open to us is through Switzerland and Austria—­a condition of affairs which would aggravate difficulties at home, and should stimulate us to carry on the war