The plan might be formed of anticipating the enemy by a sudden attack, instead of waiting passively for him to attack first, and of opening the war as the Japanese did before Port Arthur.  In this way the English fleet might be badly damaged at the outset of the real hostilities, its superiority might be lessened, and the beginning of the effective blockade delayed at least for a short time.  It is not unthinkable that such an attempt will be made.  Such an undertaking, however, does not seem to me to promise any great success.

The English have secured themselves against such attacks by comprehensive works of defence in their exposed harbours.  It seems dangerous to risk our torpedo-boats and submarines, which we shall urgently need in the later course of the war, in such bold undertakings.  Even the war against the English commerce holds out less prospects than formerly.  As soon as a state of political tension sets in, the English merchantmen will be convoyed by their numerous cruisers.  Under such circumstances our auxiliary cruisers could do little; while our foreign service ships would soon have to set about attacking the enemy’s warships, before coal ran short, for to fill up the coal-bunkers of these ships will certainly be a difficult task.

The war against the English commerce must none the less be boldly and energetically prosecuted, and should start unexpectedly.  The prizes which fall into our hands must be remorselessly destroyed, since it will usually be impossible, owing to the great English superiority and the few bases we have abroad, to bring them back in safety without exposing our vessels to great risks.  The sharpest measures must be taken against neutral ships laden with contraband.  Nevertheless, no very valuable results can be expected from a war against England’s trade.  On the contrary, England, with the numerous cruisers and auxiliary cruisers at her disposal, would be able to cripple our oversea commerce.  We must be ready for a sudden attack, even in peace-time.  It is not England’s custom to let ideal considerations fetter her action if her interests are at stake.

Under these circumstances, nothing would be left for us but to retire with our war-fleet under the guns of the coast fortifications, and by the use of mines to protect our own shores and make them dangerous to English vessels.  Mines are only an effective hindrance to attack if they can be defended.  But they can cause considerable damage if the enemy has no knowledge of their existence.

It would be necessary to take further steps to secure the importation from abroad of supplies necessary to us, since our own communications will be completely cut off by the English.  The simplest and cheapest way would be if we obtained foreign goods through Holland or perhaps neutral Belgium; and could export some part of our own products through the great Dutch and Flemish harbours.  New commercial routes might be discovered through Denmark.  Our own oversea commerce would remain suspended, but such measures would prevent an absolute stagnation of trade.