There can be no doubt that this war will be waged with England, for, although we cannot contemplate attacking England, as such an attack would be hopeless, that country itself has a lively interest in checking our political power.  It will therefore, under certain conditions, attack us, in order to annihilate our fleet and aid France.  The English have, besides, taken good care that the prospect of a war with them should always be held before our eyes.  They talk so much of a possible German attack that it cannot surprise them if the light thrown on the question is from the opposite point of view.  Again, the preparations which they are making in the North Sea show clearly that they certainly have contemplated an attack on Germany.  These preparations are like a strategic march, and the natural extension of their naval bases leaves no doubt as to their meaning.  The great military harbour of Rosyth is admittedly built for the eventuality of a war with Germany, and can mean nothing else.  Harwich has also been recently made into an especially strong naval base, and, further, the roadstead of Scapa Flow in the Orkney Isles has been enlarged into a cruiser station.  These are measures so directly and obviously directed against us that they demand an inquiry into the military position thus created.

The English have only considered the possibility of a German war since 1902.  Before that year there was no idea of any such contingency, and it is therefore not unnatural that they are eager to make up for lost time.  This fact does not alter the hostile character of the measures and the circumstance that the English preparations for war are exclusively directed against Germany.

We must therefore—­as the general position of the world leads us to believe—­reckon on the probability of a naval war with England, and shall then have to fight against an overwhelming superiority.  It will be so great that we cannot hope for a long time to be able to take the offensive against the English fleet.  But we must contemplate the possibility of becoming its master in one way or another, and of winning the freedom of the seas, if England attacks us.  We shall now discuss this possibility.  On this matter I am expressing my personal views only, which are not confused by any technical naval knowledge, and rest exclusively on general military considerations, in which our presupposed antagonists can, and will, indulge quite as well as myself.  I shall not betray any secrets of the Admiralty, since I do not know any.  But I consider it expedient that the German people should clearly understand what dangers threaten from England, and how they can be met.

In the view of these dangers and the circumstance that we are not strong enough to entertain any idea of provoking a battle, the question remains, What are the means of defensive naval strategy to secure protection from a superior and well-prepared enemy, and gradually to become its master?