The narrow coast with which we face to the North Sea forms in itself a strong front, but can easily be taken in the rear through Holland.  England is planted before our coasts in such a manner that our entire oversea commerce can be easily blocked.  In the south and south-east alone are we secured by Austria from direct invasion.  Otherwise we are encircled by our enemies.  We may have to face attacks on three sides.  This circumstance compels us to fight on the inner lines, and so presents certain advantages; but it is also fraught with dangers, if our opponents understand how to act on a correct and consistent plan.

If we look at our general political position, we cannot conceal the fact that we stand isolated, and cannot expect support from anyone in carrying out our positive political plans.  England, France, and Russia have a common interest in breaking down our power.  This interest will sooner or later be asserted by arms.  It is not therefore the interest of any nation to increase Germany’s power.  If we wish to attain an extension of our power, as is natural in our position, we must win it by the sword against vastly superior foes.  Our alliances are defensive, not merely in form, but essentially so.  I have already shown that this is a cause of their weakness.  Neither Austria nor Italy are in any way bound to support by armed force a German policy directed towards an increase of power.  We are not even sure of their diplomatic help, as the conduct of Italy at the conference of Algeciras sufficiently demonstrated.  It even seems questionable at the present moment whether we can always reckon on the support of the members of the Triple Alliance in a defensive war.  The recent rapprochement of Italy with France and England goes far beyond the idea of an “extra turn.”  If we consider how difficult Italy would find it to make her forces fit to cope with France, and to protect her coasts against hostile attacks, and if we think how the annexation of Tripoli has created a new possession, which is not easily defended against France and England, we may fairly doubt whether Italy would take part in a war in which England and France were allied against us.  Austria is undoubtedly a loyal ally.  Her interests are closely connected with our own, and her policy is dominated by the same spirit of loyalty and integrity as ours towards Austria.  Nevertheless, there is cause for anxiety, because in a conglomerate State like Austria, which contains numerous Slavonic elements, patriotism may not be strong enough to allow the Government to fight to the death with Russia, were the latter to defeat us.  The occurrence of such an event is not improbable.  When enumerating the possibilities that might affect our policy, we cannot leave this one out of consideration.

We shall therefore some day, perhaps, be faced with the necessity of standing isolated in a great war of the nations, as once Frederick the Great stood, when he was basely deserted by England in the middle of the struggle, and shall have to trust to our own strength and our own resolution for victory.