Such conditions must obviously affect the character of the war.  Russia will certainly put huge armies into the field against us.  In the wars against Turkey and Japan the internal affairs of the Empire prevented the employment of its full strength; in the latter campaign revolutionary agitation in the army itself influenced the operations and battles, and in a European war the same conditions would, in all probability, make themselves emphatically felt, especially if defeats favoured or encouraged revolutionary propaganda.  In a war against Russia, more than in any other war, c’est le premier pas qui coute.

If the first operations are unsuccessful, their effect on the whole position will be wider than in any other war, since they will excite in the country itself not sympathetic feelings only, but also hostile forces which would cripple the conduct of the war.

So far as the efficiency of the Russian army goes, the Russo-Japanese War proved that the troops fight with great stubbornness.  The struggle showed numerous instances of heroic self-devotion, and the heaviest losses were often borne with courage.  On the other hand, the Russian army quite failed on the offensive, in a certain sense tactically, but essentially owing to the inadequacy of the commanders and the failure of the individuals.  The method of conducting the war was quite wrong; indecision and irresolution characterized the Russian officers of every grade, and no personality came forward who ever attempted to rise above mediocrity.  It can hardly be presumed that the spirit of Russian generalship has completely changed since the defeats in Manchuria, and that striking personalities have come on the stage.  This army must therefore always be met with a bold policy of attack.

When we contrast these conditions with the position of Germany, we cannot blink the fact that we have to deal with immense military difficulties, if we are to attain our own political ends or repel successfully the attack of our opponents.

In the first place, the geographical configuration and position of our country are very unfavourable.  Our open eastern frontier offers no opportunity for continued defence, and Berlin, the centre of the government and administration, lies in dangerous proximity to it.  Our western frontier, in itself strong, can be easily turned on the north through Belgium and Holland.  No natural obstacle, no strong fortress, is there to oppose a hostile invasion and neutrality is only a paper bulwark.  So in the south, the barrier of the Rhine can easily be turned through Switzerland.  There, of course, the character of the country offers considerable difficulties, and if the Swiss defend themselves resolutely, it might not be easy to break down their resistance.  Their army is no despicable factor of strength, and if they were attacked in their mountains they would fight as they did at Sempach and Murten.

The natural approaches from the North Sea to the Baltic, the Sound and the Great Belt, are commanded by foreign guns, and can easily fall a prey to our enemies.