If England, as must be regarded probable, determines sooner or later on this step, it is clearly to her advantage to win a rapid victory.  In the first place, her own trade will not be injured longer than necessary by the war; in the second place, the centrifugal forces of her loosely compacted World Empire might be set in movement, and the Colonies might consult their own separate interests, should England have her hands tied by a great war.  It is not unlikely that revolutions might break out in India and Egypt, if England’s forces were long occupied with a European war.  Again, the States not originally taking part in the war might interfere in our favour, if the decision were much delayed.  It was important for us in 1870-71 to take Paris quickly, in order to forestall any interference of neutrals.  Similar conditions might arise in the case of England.  We must therefore make up our minds that the attack by sea will be made with the greatest and most persistent vigour, with the firm resolve to destroy completely our fleet and our great commercial centres.  It is also not only possible, but probable, that England will throw troops on the Continent, in order to secure the co-operation of her allies, who might demand this guarantee of the sincerity of English policy, and also to support the naval attack on the coast.  On the other hand, the land war will display the same kind of desperate energy only so far as it pursues the object of conquering and destroying our naval bases.  The English would be the less disposed to do more than this because the German auxiliaries, who have so often fought England’s battles, would not be forthcoming.  The greatest exertions of the nation will be limited to the naval war.  The land war will be waged with a definitely restricted object, on which its character will depend.  It is very questionable whether the English army is capable of effectively acting on the offensive against Continental European troops.  In South Africa the English regiments for the most part fought very bravely and stood great losses; on the other hand, they completely failed in the offensive, in tactics as in operations, and with few exceptions the generalship was equally deficient.  The last manoeuvres on a large scale, held in Ireland, under the direction of General French, did not, according to available information, show the English army in a favourable light so far as strategical ability went.

If we now turn our attention to the East, in order to forecast Russia’s probable behaviour, we must begin by admitting that, from a Russian standpoint, a war in the West holds out better prospects of success than a renewed war with Japan, and possibly with China.  The Empire of the Czar finds in the West powerful allies, who are impatiently waiting to join in an attack on Germany.  The geographical conditions and means of communication there allow a far more rapid and systematic development of power than in Manchuria.  Public opinion, in which hatred of