they make two.  They have, as a nation, so greatly prospered under its combined enactments, and possess such an unlimited independence in their individual States, that although the exclusion of the Cabinet is now very generally admitted to be an error, I saw no inclination to moot the question; probably, lest other questions affecting the slave and non-slave-holding States might be brought on the boards, and again disturb the bonds of union.

Another very remarkable—­and in a Republic anomalous—­feature in the government, is the power of the President, who, by the Constitution, is enabled during his four years’ tenure of office to rule in total opposition to the majority, obstructing all the measures they may bring forward, unless the majority amounts to two-thirds in both Houses of Congress.

Article I., section 7, clause 2, runs thus:—­“Every bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate shall, before it become a law, be presented to the President of the United States; if he approves, he shall sign it, but if not, he shall return it with his objections to that House in which it shall have originated, who shall enter the objections at large on their journal, and proceed to re-consider it.  If after such re-consideration two-thirds of that House shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with the objections, to the other House, by which it shall likewise be re-considered, and if approved by two-thirds of that House, it shall become a law,” &c.

This power of the President has been used by Washington, Jackson, Tyler, and Polk; particularly by Tyler, who opposed the wishes of the majority even when those wishes were backed by his own ministry.  During the discussions on the Constitution, many of the wisest heads at that eventful period desired to establish the Presidency for life, but eventually the term of four years was agreed upon; and if such powers of obstructing the wishes of a majority were to accompany the office, it certainly was a prudent conclusion they arrived at.  In a densely populated community like Great Britain, such powers, whether in the hands of the sovereign or the ministers, would produce a revolution in much less time than four years.  It may, however, be questioned, whether these powers are not productive of evil, by rendering necessary such frequent elections for the Presidency.  On this point, Mr. Justice Story states:  “The inconvenience of such frequently recurring elections of the chief magistrate, by generating factions, combining intrigues, and agitating the public mind, seems not hitherto to have attracted as much attention, as it deserves.”  And Chancellor Kent remarks, that “the election of a supreme executive magistrate for a whole nation affects so many interests, addresses itself so strongly to popular passions, and holds out such powerful temptations to ambition, that it necessarily becomes a strong trial to public virtue, and even hazardous to public tranquillity.”