Then, writing as an Englishman, my first thought of the European map is naturally of Belgium.  Only absolute smashing defeat could force either Britain or France to consent to anything short of the complete restoration of Belgium.  Rather than give that consent they will both carry the war to at present undreamt-of extremities.  Belgium must be restored; her neutrality must be replaced by a defensive alliance with her two Western Allies; and if the world has still to reckon with Hohenzollerns, then her frontier must be thrust forward into the adjacent French-speaking country so as to minimise the chances of any second surprise.

It is manifest that every frontier that gives upon the Hohenzollerns must henceforth be entrenched line behind line, and held permanently by a garrison ready for any treachery, and it becomes of primary importance that the Franco-Belgian line should be as short and strong as possible.  Aix, which Germany has made a mere jumping-off place for aggressions, should clearly be held by Belgium against a Hohenzollern Empire, and the fortified and fiscal frontier would run from it southward to include the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, with its French sympathies and traditions, in the permanent alliance.  It is quite impossible to leave this ambiguous territory as it was before the war, with its railway in German hands and its postal and telegraphic service (since 1913) under Hohenzollern control.  It is quite impossible to hand over this strongly anti-Prussian population to Hohenzollern masters.

But an Englishman must needs write with diffidence upon this question of the Western boundary.  It is clear that all the boundaries of 1914 from Aix to Bale are a part of ancient history.  No “as you were” is possible there.  And it is not the business of anyone in Great Britain to redraw them.  That task on our side lies between France and Belgium.  The business of Great Britain in the matter is as plain as daylight.  It is to support to her last man and her last ounce of gold those new boundaries her allies consider essential to their comfort and security.

But I do not see how France, unless she is really convinced she is beaten, can content herself with anything less than a strong Franco-Belgian frontier from Aix, that will take in at least Metz and Saarburg.  She knows best the psychology of the lost provinces, and what amount of annexation will spell weakness or strength.  If she demands all Alsace-Lorraine back from the Hohenzollerns, British opinion is resolved to support her, and to go through with this struggle until she gets it.  To guess at the direction of the new line is not to express a British opinion, but to speculate upon the opinion of France.  After the experience of Luxembourg and Belgium no one now dreams of a neutralised buffer State.  What does not become French or Belgian of the Rhineland will remain German—­for ever.  That is perhaps conceivable, for example, of Strassburg and the low-lying parts of Alsace.  I do not know enough to do more than guess.