devised it in 1790 actually supposed that they were inaugurating a system or political freedom(!), and unquestionably it was a vast improvement upon the wretched system which it supplanted; but as contrasted with American methods and institutions, it is difficult to call it anything else than a highly centralized despotism.  It has gone on without essential change through all the revolutions which have overtaken France since 1800.  The people have from time to time overthrown an unpopular government at Paris, but they have never assumed the direct control of their own affairs.

Hence it is commonly remarked that while the general intelligence of the French people is very high, their intelligence in political matters is, comparatively speaking, very low.  Some persons try to explain this by a reference to peculiarities of race.  But if we Americans were to set about giving to the state governments things to do that had better be done by counties and towns, and giving the federal government things to do that had better be done by the states, it would not take many generations to dull the keen edge of our political capacity.  We should lose it as inevitably as the most consummate of pianists will lose his facility if he stops practising.  It is therefore a fact of cardinal importance that in the United States the local governments of township, county, and city are left to administer themselves instead of being administered by a great bureau with its head at the state capital.  In a political society thus constituted from the beginning it has proved possible to build up our Federal Union, in which the states, while for certain purposes indissolubly united, at the same time for many other purposes retain their self-government intact.  As in the case of other aggregates, the nature of the American political aggregate has been determined by the nature of its political units.

[Sidenote:  Vastness of the functions retained by the states in the American Union.] Secondly, let us observe how great are the functions retained by our states under the conditions of our Federal Union.  The powers granted to our federal government, such as the control over international questions, war and peace, the military forces, the coinage, patents and copyrights, and the regulation of commerce between the states and with foreign countries,—­all these are powers relating to matters that affect all the states, but could not be regulated harmoniously by the separate action of the states.  In order the more completely to debar the states from meddling with such matters, they are expressly prohibited from entering into agreements with each other or with a foreign power; they cannot engage in war, save in case of actual invasion or such imminent danger as admits of no delay; without consent of Congress they cannot keep a military or naval force in time of peace, or impose custom-house duties.  Besides all this they are prohibited from granting titles of nobility, coining money, emitting bills of credit, making anything but gold and silver coin a tender in payment of debts, passing bills of attainder, ex post facto laws, or laws impairing the obligation of contracts.  The force of these latter restrictions will be explained hereafter.  Such are the limitations of sovereignty imposed upon the states within the Federal Union.