[Sidenote:  Separation between legislation and the executive.] A peculiar feature of American governments, and something which it is hard for Europeans to understand, is the almost complete separation between the executive and the legislative departments.  In European countries the great executive officers are either members of the legislature, or at all events have the right to be present at its meetings and take part in its discussions; and as they generally have some definite policy by which they are to stand or fall, they are wont to initiate legislation and to guide the course of the discussion.  But in America the legislatures, having no such central points about which to rally their forces, carry on their work in an aimless, rambling sort of way, through the agency of many standing committees.  When a measure is proposed it is referred to one of the committees for examination before the house will have anything to do with it.  Such a preliminary examination is of course necessary where there is a vast amount of legislative work going on.  But the private and disconnected way in which our committee work is done tends to prevent full and instructive discussion in the house, to make the mass of legislation, always chaotic enough, somewhat more chaotic, and to facilitate the various evil devices of lobbying and log-rolling.

In pointing out this inconvenience attendant upon the American plan of separating the executive and legislative departments, I must not be understood as advocating the European plan as preferable for this country.  The evils that inevitably flow from any fundamental change in the institutions of a country are apt to be much more serious than the evils which the change is intended to remove.  Political government is like a plant; a little watering and pruning do very well for it, but the less its roots are fooled with, the better.  In the American system of government the independence of the executive department, with reference to the legislative, is fundamental; and on the whole it is eminently desirable.  One of the most serious of the dangers which beset democratic government, especially where it is conducted on a great scale, is the danger that the majority for the time being will use its power tyrannically and unscrupulously, as it is always tempted to do.  Against such unbridled democracy we have striven to guard ourselves by various constitutional checks and balances.  Our written constitutions and our Supreme Court are important safeguards, as will be shown below.  The independence of our executives is another important safeguard.  But if our executive departments were mere committees of the legislature—­like the English cabinet, for example—­this independence could not possibly be maintained; and the loss of it would doubtless entail upon us evils far greater than those which mow flow from want of leadership in our legislatures.[11]

[Footnote 11:  In two admirable essays on “Cabinet Responsibility and the Constitution,” and “Democracy and the Constitution,” Mr. Lawrence Lowell has convincingly argued that the American system is best adapted to the circumstances of this country.  Lowell, Essays on Government, pp. 20-117, Boston, 1890.]